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INNOVATION AND COMPETITION POLICY: 
CASES AND MATERIALS 
HERBERT HOVENKAMP 
 
CHAPTER 5 (2d ed) 
COMPETITION AND INNOVATION IN COPYRIGHT AND 
THE DMCA 
 
I.  EXCLUSION BY COPYRIGHT OR THE DMCA 
 
ASSESSMENT TECH. OF WI., LLC V. WIREDATA, INC. 
350 F.3d 640 (7
th
 Cir. 2003) 
 
Posner, Circuit Judge: 
 
This case is about the attempt of a copyright owner to use copyright 
law to block access to data that not only are neither copyrightable nor 
copyrighted, but were not created or obtained by the copyright owner. The 
owner is trying to secrete the data in its copyrighted program-a program the 
existence of which reduced the likelihood that the data would be retained in 
a form in which they would have been readily accessible. It would be 
appalling if such an attempt could succeed. 
 
Assessment Technologies (AT, we'll call it) brought suit for 
copyright infringement and theft of trade secrets against WIREdata, and the 
district court after an evidentiary hearing issued a permanent injunction on 
the basis of AT's copyright claim alone, without reaching the trade secret 
claim. A sample database in the demo version of AT's product-a version 
freely distributed for promotional purposes-reveals the entire structure of 
the database, thus making the trade secret claim incomprehensible to us. But 
we shall not make a formal ruling on the claim. It was not addressed either 
by the district court or by the parties in their submissions in this court, and 
conceivably if improbably it has more merit than we can find in it. 
 
The copyright case seeks to block WIREdata from obtaining 
noncopyrighted data. AT claims that the data can't be extracted without 
infringement of its copyright. The copyright is of a compilation format, and 
the general issue that the appeal presents is the right of the owner of such a 
copyright to prevent his customers (that is, the copyright licensees) from 
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disclosing the compiled data even if the data are in the public domain. 
 
WIREdata, owned by Multiple Listing Services, Inc., wants to 
obtain, for use by real estate brokers, data regarding specific properties-
address, owner's name, the age of the property, its assessed valuation, the 
number and type of rooms, and so forth-from the southeastern Wisconsin 
municipalities in which the properties are located. The municipalities 
collect such data in order to assess the value of the properties for property-
tax purposes. Ordinarily they're happy to provide the data to anyone who 
will pay the modest cost of copying the data onto a disk. Indeed, 
Wisconsin's “open records” law, requires them to furnish such data to any 
person who will pay the copying cost. However, three municipalities 
refused WIREdata's request. They (or the contractors who do the actual tax 
assessment for them) are licensees of AT. The open-records law contains an 
exception for copyrighted materials, and these municipalities are afraid that 
furnishing WIREdata the requested data would violate the copyright. 
WIREdata has sued them in the state courts of Wisconsin in an attempt to 
force them to divulge the data, and those suits are pending. Alarmed by 
WIREdata's suits, AT brought the present suit to stop WIREdata from 
making such demands of the municipalities and seeking to enforce them by 
litigation. 
 
The data that WIREdata wants are collected not by AT but by tax 
assessors hired by the municipalities. The assessors visit the property and 
by talking to the owner and poking around the property itself obtain the 
information that we mentioned in the preceding paragraph-the age of the 
property, the number of rooms, and so forth. AT has developed and 
copyrighted a computer program, called “Market Drive,” for compiling 
these data. The assessor types into a computer the data that he has obtained 
from his visit to the property or from other sources of information and then 
the Market Drive program, in conjunction with a Microsoft database 
program (Microsoft Access), automatically allocates the data to 456 fields 
(that is, categories of information) grouped into 34 master categories known 
as tables. Several types of data relating to a property, each allocated to a 
different field, are grouped together in a table called “Income Valuations,” 
others in a table called “Residential Buildings,” and so on. The data 
collected by the various assessors and inputted in the manner just described 
are stored in an electronic file, the database. The municipality's tax officials 
can use various queries in Market Drive or Market Access to view the data 
in the file. 
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WIREdata's appeal gets off on the wrong foot, with the contention 
that Market Drive lacks sufficient originality to be copyrightable. Copyright 
law unlike patent law does not require substantial originality. In fact, it 
requires only enough originality to enable a work to be distinguished from 
similar works that are in the public domain, Bucklew v. Hawkins, Ash, 
Baptie & Co., 329 F.3d 923, 929 (7th Cir.2003), since without some 
discernible distinction it would be impossible to determine whether a 
subsequent work was copying a copyrighted work or a public-domain work. 
This modest requirement is satisfied by Market Drive because no other real 
estate assessment program arranges the data collected by the assessor in 
these 456 fields grouped into these 34 categories, and because this structure 
is not so obvious or inevitable as to lack the minimal originality required, as 
it would if the compilation program simply listed data in alphabetical or 
numerical order. Feist Publications, Inc. v. Rural Telephone Service Co., 
supra, 499 U.S. at 362-64. The obvious orderings, the lexical and the 
numeric, have long been in the public domain, and what is in the public 
domain cannot be appropriated by claiming copyright. Alternatively, if 
there is only one way in which to express an idea-for example, alphabetical 
order for the names in a phone book-then form and idea merge, and in that 
case since an idea cannot be copyrighted the copying of the form is not an 
infringement. That is not the situation here. 
 
So AT has a valid copyright; and if WIREdata said to itself, “Market 
Drive is a nifty way of sorting real estate data and we want the 
municipalities to give us their data in the form in which it is organized in 
the database, that is, sorted into AT's 456 fields grouped into its 34 tables,” 
and the municipalities obliged, they would be infringing AT's copyright 
because they are not licensed to make copies of Market Drive for 
distribution to others; and WIREdata would be a contributory infringer 
(subject to a qualification concerning the fair-use defense to copyright 
infringement, including contributory infringement, that we discuss later). 
But WIREdata doesn't want the compilation as structured by Market Drive. 
It isn't in the business of making tax assessments, which is the business for 
which Market Drive is designed. It only wants the raw data, the data the 
assessors inputted into Market Drive. Once it gets those data it will sort 
them in accordance with its own needs, which have to do with providing the 
information about properties that is useful to real estate brokers as opposed 
to taxing authorities…. 
 
From the standpoint of copyright law all that matters is that the 
process of extracting the raw data from the database does not involve 
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copying Market Drive, or creating, as AT mysteriously asserts, a derivative 
work; all that is sought is raw data, data created not by AT but by the 
assessors, data that are in the public domain. A derivative work is a 
translation or other transformation of an original work and must itself 
contain minimum originality for the same evidentiary reason that we noted 
in discussing the requirement that a copyrighted work be original.  A work 
that merely copies uncopyrighted material is wholly unoriginal and the 
making of such a work is therefore not an infringement of copyright. The 
municipalities would not be infringing Market Drive by extracting the raw 
data from the databases by either method that we discussed and handing 
those data over to WIREdata; and since there would thus be no direct 
infringement, neither would there be contributory infringement by 
WIREdata. It would be like a Westlaw licensee's copying the text of a 
federal judicial opinion that he found in the Westlaw opinion database and 
giving it to someone else. Westlaw's compilation of federal judicial 
opinions is copyrighted and copyrightable because it involves discretionary 
judgments regarding selection and arrangement. But the opinions 
themselves are in the public domain (federal law forbids assertion of 
copyright in federal documents, 17 U.S.C. § 105), and so Westlaw cannot 
prevent its licensees from copying the opinions themselves as distinct from 
the aspects of the database that are copyrighted. See Matthew Bender & Co. 
v. West Publishing Co., 158 F.3d 693 (2d Cir.1998). 
 
AT would lose this copyright case even if the raw data were so 
entangled with Market Drive that they could not be extracted without 
making a copy of the program. The case would then be governed by Sega 
Enterprises Ltd. v. Accolade, Inc., 977 F.2d 1510, 1520-28 (9th Cir.1992). 
Sega manufactured a game console, which is a specialized computer, and 
copyrighted the console's operating system, including the source code. 
Accolade wanted to make computer games that would be compatible with 
Sega's console, and to that end it bought a Sega console and through reverse 
engineering reconstructed the source code, from which it would learn how 
to design its games so that they would activate the operating system. For 
technical reasons, Accolade had to make a copy of the source code in order 
to be able to obtain this information. It didn't want to sell the source code, 
produce a game-console operating system, or make any other use of the 
copyrighted code except to be able to sell a noninfringing product, namely a 
computer game. The court held that this “intermediate copying” of the 
operating system was a fair use, since the only effect of enjoining it would 
be to give Sega control over noninfringing products, namely Accolade's 
games. See also Sony Computer Entertainment, Inc. v. Connectix Corp., 
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203 F.3d 596, 602-08 (9th Cir.2000). Similarly, if the only way WIREdata 
could obtain public-domain data about properties in southeastern Wisconsin 
would be by copying the data in the municipalities' databases as embedded 
in Market Drive, so that it would be copying the compilation and not just 
the compiled data only because the data and the format in which they were 
organized could not be disentangled, it would be privileged to make such a 
copy, and likewise the municipalities. For the only purpose of the copying 
would be to extract noncopyrighted material, and not to go into competition 
with AT by selling copies of Market Drive. We emphasize this point lest 
AT try to circumvent our decision by reconfiguring Market Drive in such a 
way that the municipalities would find it difficult or impossible to furnish 
the raw data to requesters such as WIREdata in any format other than that 
prescribed by Market Drive. If AT did that with that purpose it might be 
guilty of copyright misuse, of which more shortly. 
 
AT argues that WIREdata doesn't need to obtain the data in digital 
form because they exist in analog form, namely in the handwritten notes of 
the assessors, notes that all agree are not covered by the Market Drive 
copyright. But we were told at argument without contradiction that some 
assessors no longer make handwritten notes to copy into a computer at a 
later time. Instead they take their laptop to the site and type the information 
in directly. So WIREdata could not possibly obtain all the data it wants (all 
of which data are in the public domain, we emphasize) from the handwritten 
notes. But what is more fundamental is that since AT has no ownership or 
other legal interest in the data collected by the assessor, it has no legal 
ground for making the acquisition of that data more costly for WIREdata. 
AT is trying to use its copyright to sequester uncopyrightable data, 
presumably in the hope of extracting a license fee from WIREdata. 
 
We are mindful of pressures, reflected in bills that have been 
pending in Congress for years, Jonathan Band & Makoto Kono, “The 
Database Protection Debate in the 106th Congress,” 62 Ohio St. L.J. 869 
(2001), to provide legal protection to the creators of databases, as Europe 
has already done. Jane C. Ginsburg, “Copyright, Common Law, and Sui 
Generis Protection of Databases in the United States and Abroad,” 66 U. 
Cinc. L.Rev. 151 (1997). (Ironically, considering who owns WIREdata, the 
multiple-listing services are pressing for such protection. Ron Eckstein, 
“The Database Debate,” Legal Times, Jan. 24, 2000, p. 16.) The creation of 
massive electronic databases can be extremely costly, yet if the database is 
readily searchable and the data themselves are not copyrightable (and we 
know from Feist that mere data are indeed not copyrightable) the creator 
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may find it difficult or even impossible to recoup the expense of creating 
the database. Legal protection of databases as such (as distinct from 
programs for arranging the data, like Market Drive) cannot take the form of 
copyright, as the Supreme Court made clear in Feist when it held that the 
copyright clause of the Constitution does not authorize Congress to create 
copyright in mere data. But that is neither here nor there; what needs to be 
emphasized in this case is that the concerns (whether or not valid, as 
questioned in Ginsburg, supra, and also J.H. Reichman & Pamela 
Samuelson, “Intellectual Property Rights in Data?” 50 Vand. L.Rev. 51 
(1997), and Stephen M. Maurer & Suzanne Scotchmer, “Database 
Protection: Is It Broken and Should We Fix It?” 284 Sci. 1129 (1999)) that 
actuate the legislative proposals for database protection have no relevance 
because AT is not the collector of the data that go into the database. All the 
data are collected and inputted by the assessors; it is they, not AT, that do 
the footwork, the heavy lifting…. 
 
[I]t is irrelevant that ProCD, Inc. v. Zeidenberg, 86 F.3d 1447, 1453-
55 (7th Cir.1996), holds that a copyright owner can by contract limit 
copying beyond the right that a copyright confers. Like other property 
rights, a copyright is enforceable against persons with whom the owner has 
no contractual relations; so a property owner can eject a trespasser even 
though the trespasser had not contractually bound himself to refrain from 
entering the property. That is why AT is suing WIREdata for copyright 
infringement rather than for breach of contract. The scope of a copyright is 
given by federal law, but the scope of contractual protection is, at least 
prima facie, whatever the parties to the contract agreed to. The existence of 
contractual solutions to the problem of copying the contents of databases is 
one of the reasons that Professor Ginsburg and others are skeptical about 
the need for legislative protection of databases. But our plaintiff did not 
create the database that it is seeking to sequester from WIREdata; or to be 
more precise, it created only an empty database, a bin that the tax assessors 
filled with the data. It created the compartments in the bin and the 
instructions for sorting the data to those compartments, but those were its 
only innovations and their protection by copyright law is complete. To try 
by contract or otherwise to prevent the municipalities from revealing their 
own data, especially when, as we have seen, the complete data are 
unavailable anywhere else, might constitute copyright misuse. 
 
The doctrine of misuse “prevents copyright holders from leveraging 
their limited monopoly to allow them control of areas outside the 
monopoly.” A & M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc., 239 F.3d 1004, 1026-27 
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(9th Cir.2001). The data in the municipalities' tax-assessment databases are 
beyond the scope of AT's copyright. It is true that in Reed-Union Corp. v. 
Turtle Wax, Inc., 77 F.3d 909, 913 (7th Cir.1996), we left open the question 
whether copyright misuse, unless it rises to the level of an antitrust 
violation, is a defense to infringement; our earlier decision in Saturday 
Evening Post Co. v. Rumbleseat Press, Inc., 816 F.2d 1191, 1200 (7th 
Cir.1987), had intimated skepticism. No effort has been made by WIREdata 
to show that AT has market power merely by virtue of its having a 
copyright on one system for compiling valuation data for real estate tax 
assessment purposes. Cases such as Lasercomb, however, cut misuse free 
from antitrust, pointing out that the cognate doctrine of patent misuse is not 
so limited, 911 F.2d at 977-78, though a difference is that patents tend to 
confer greater market power on their owners than copyrights do, since 
patents protect ideas and copyrights, as we have noted, do not. The 
argument for applying copyright misuse beyond the bounds of antitrust, 
besides the fact that confined to antitrust the doctrine would be redundant, is 
that for a copyright owner to use an infringement suit to obtain property 
protection, here in data, that copyright law clearly does not confer, hoping 
to force a settlement or even achieve an outright victory over an opponent 
that may lack the resources or the legal sophistication to resist effectively, is 
an abuse of process. 
 
We need not run this hare to the ground; nor decide whether the 
licenses interpreted as AT would have us interpret them-as barring 
municipalities from disclosing noncopyrighted data-would violate the state's 
open-records law.  WIREdata is not a licensee of AT, and AT is not suing to 
enforce any contract it might have with WIREdata. It therefore had no cause 
to drag the licenses before us. But since it did, we shall not conceal our 
profound skepticism concerning AT's interpretation. If accepted, it would 
forbid municipalities licensed by AT to share the data in their tax-
assessment databases with each other even for the purpose of comparing or 
coordinating their assessment methods, though all the data they would be 
exchanging would be data that their assessors had collected and inputted 
into the databases. That seems an absurd result. 
 
To summarize, there are at least four possible methods by which 
WIREdata can obtain the data it is seeking without infringing AT's 
copyright; which one is selected is for the municipality to decide in light of 
applicable trade-secret, open-records, and contract laws. The methods are: 
(1) the municipalities use Market Drive to extract the data and place it in an 
electronic file; (2) they use Microsoft Access to create an electronic file of 
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the data; (3) they allow programmers furnished by WIREdata to use their 
computers to extract the data from their database-this is really just an 
alternative to WIREdata's paying the municipalities' cost of extraction, 
which the open-records law requires; (4) they copy the database file and 
give it to WIREdata to extract the data from. 
 
The judgment is reversed with instructions to vacate the injunction 
and dismiss the copyright claim. 
 
Reversed And Remanded, With Instructions. 
 
NOTES AND QUESTIONS 
 
1.  Judge Posner states, “Copyright law unlike patent law does not require 
substantial originality. In fact, it requires only enough originality to enable a 
work to be distinguished from similar works that are in the public domain.”  
Patent law requires novelty, meaning that there has been no identical prior 
invention (35 U.S.C. §102), and non-obviousness, which requires that the 
invention must be a significant technical advancement (35 U.S.C. §103) in 
order to obtain a patent.  However, with copyright law, there is only a 
minimal creativity requirement. 
 
 Consider Feist Publications v. Rural Telephone Service, 499 U.S. 
340 (1991).  Rural Telephone Service, a telephone utility, brought a 
copyright infringement action against Feist Publications, a publisher of 
telephone directories.  Following a state statute, Rural published a standard 
telephone directory, with white and yellow pages, for its subscribers.  Feist, 
which published telephone directories for a much larger geographical range 
than Rural’s area, requested a license to Rural’s published listings.  Rural 
denied the license.  However, Feist went on and extracted the listings 
without Rural’s consent.  Rural sued for copyright infringement. Finding for 
Feist, Justice O’Connor in her majority opinion reiterated that, “To be sure, 
the requisite level of creativity is extremely low; even a slight amount will 
suffice. The vast majority of works make the grade quite easily, as they 
possess some creative spark, no matter how crude, humble or obvious it 
might be. Originality does not signify novelty.” Id. at 345. However, the 
listing of facts is not and never has been copyrightable, and therefore the 
Court concluded that, “the names, towns, and telephone numbers copied by 
Feist were not original to Rural and therefore were not protected by the 
copyright in Rural's combined white and yellow pages directory. As a 
constitutional matter, copyright protects only those constituent elements of 
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a work that possess more than a de minimis quantum of creativity. Rural's 
white pages, limited to basic subscriber information and arranged 
alphabetically, fall short of the mark.” Id. at 363. 
 
2.  In Omega S.A. v. Costco Wholesale Corp., 2011 WL 8492716 (C.D.Cal. 
Nov. 9, 2011), the court found copyright misuse when Omega, a Swiss 
watch manufacturer, placed a copyrighted emblem on each of its watches.  
Ordinarily the watches, once sold, could be freely imported into the United 
States.  However, the Copyright Act, 17 U.S.C. §602, makes unauthorized 
importation of copyrighted goods a violation of the copyright owner's right 
to distribute.  Omega conceded that it placed the copyrighted emblem on its 
watches in order to prevent them from being imported into the United 
States.   
 
 
CHAMBERLAIN GROUP, INC. V. SKYLINK TECH., INC. 
381 F.3d 1178 (Fed. Cir. 2004) 
 
1. GAJARSA, Circuit Judge. 
 
…  Chamberlain sued Skylink, alleging violations of the patent and 
copyright laws. Chamberlain's second amended complaint, dated March 26, 
2003, enumerated eight causes of action against Skylink, including the 
infringement of three patents. The matter on appeal involves only 
Chamberlain's allegation that Skylink is violating the DMCA, specifically 
the anti-trafficking provision of § 1201(a)(2)….. 
 
The technology at issue involves Garage Door Openers (GDOs). A 
GDO typically consists of a hand-held portable transmitter and a garage 
door opening device mounted in a homeowner's garage. The opening 
device, in turn, includes both a receiver with associated signal processing 
software and a motor to open or close the garage door. In order to open or 
close the garage door, a user must activate the transmitter, which sends a 
radio frequency (RF) signal to the receiver located on the opening device. 
Once the opener receives a recognized signal, the signal processing 
software directs the motor to open or close the garage door. 
 
When a homeowner purchases a GDO system, the manufacturer 
provides both an opener and a transmitter. Homeowners who desire 
replacement or spare transmitters can purchase them in the aftermarket. 
Aftermarket consumers have long been able to purchase “universal 
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transmitters” that they can program to interoperate with their GDO system 
regardless of make or model. Skylink and Chamberlain are the only 
significant distributors of universal GDO transmitters.
1
 Chamberlain places 
no explicit restrictions on the types of transmitter that the homeowner may 
use with its system at the time of purchase. Chamberlain's customers 
therefore assume that they enjoy all of the rights associated with the use of 
their GDOs and any software embedded therein that the copyright laws and 
other laws of commerce provide. 
 
This dispute involves Chamberlain's Security+ line of GDOs and 
Skylink's Model 39 universal transmitter. Chamberlain's Security+ GDOs 
incorporate a copyrighted “rolling code” computer program that constantly 
changes the transmitter signal needed to open the garage door. Skylink's 
Model 39 transmitter, which does not incorporate rolling code, nevertheless 
allows users to operate Security+ openers. Chamberlain alleges that 
Skylink's transmitter renders the Security+ insecure by allowing 
unauthorized users to circumvent the security inherent in rolling codes. Of 
greater legal significance, however, Chamberlain contends that because of 
this property of the Model 39, Skylink is in violation of the anti-trafficking 
clause of the DMCA's anticircumvention provisions, specifically § 
1201(a)(2)…. 
 
The essence of the rolling code system is that the transmitted signals 
are broken into fixed and variable (or “rolling”) components. The entire 
transmitted signal is a bit string. The fixed component serves to identify the 
transmitter. The rolling component cycles through a lengthy cycle of bit 
strings only some of which are capable of opening the door at any given 
time, ostensibly so that a burglar replaying a grabbed code is unlikely to 
send a valid signal-and therefore unlikely to open the garage door…. 
 
Skylink began marketing and selling universal transmitters in 1992. 
Skylink designed its Model 39, launched in August 2002, to interoperate 
with common GDOs, including both rolling code and non-rolling code 
GDOs.  Although Chamberlain concedes that the Model 39 transmitter is 
capable of operating many different GDOs, it nevertheless asserts that 
Skylink markets the Model 39 transmitter for use in circumventing its 
copyrighted rolling code computer program. Chamberlain supports this 
allegation by pointing to the Model 39's setting that 
operates only Chamberlain's rolling code GDOs. 
                                                 
1
 Chamberlain's product, the “Clicker,” interoperates with both Chamberlain 
and non-Chamberlain GDOs. 
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Skylink's Model 39 does not use rolling code technology. Like 
Chamberlain's products, however, the Model 39's binary signal contains two 
components. The first corresponds to the Chamberlain's fixed component 
identifying the transmitter, and the second simulates the effect of the 
Chamberlain's rolling code. Like the Chamberlain fixed component, the 
primary role of the Model 39's identifying component is in programming; a 
homeowner wishing to use a Model 39 in conjunction with a Chamberlain 
GDO must program the opener to recognize his newly purchased 
transmitter…. 
 
[I]t is nevertheless noteworthy that Chamberlain has not alleged 
either that Skylink infringed its copyright or that Skylink is liable for 
contributory copyright infringement. What Chamberlain has alleged is that 
because its opener and transmitter both incorporate computer programs 
“protected by copyright” and because rolling codes are a “technological 
measure” that “controls access” to those programs, Skylink is prima facie 
liable for violating § 1201(a)(2). 
 
…  According to Chamberlain, “Skylink did not seriously dispute 
that the operation of its transmitters bypasses Chamberlain's rolling code 
security measure to gain access to Chamberlain's copyrighted GDO receiver 
operating software, but instead focuses on an ‘authorization’ defense.” 
Given that “plain language” interpretation of the statute, Chamberlain also 
argues that the District Court erred in assigning the plaintiff the burden of 
proving that access was unauthorized rather than placing the burden on the 
defendant to prove that the access was authorized. Finally, with the burden 
thus shifted, Chamberlain argues that Skylink has not met its burden, and 
that the District Court's grant of summary judgment was therefore in error. 
 
Skylink primarily urges us to adopt both the District Court's 
construction and its application of its construction to the facts of this case. 
In particular, Skylink urges us not to place the burden of proving 
authorization on defendants, arguing that it would be tantamount to reading 
a new “authority” requirement into the DMCA To resolve this dispute, we 
must first construe the relevant portions of the DMCA, and then apply the 
statute, properly construed, to the specific facts at issue….. 
 
The essence of the DMCA's anticircumvention provisions is that §§ 
1201(a),(b) establish causes of action for liability. They do not establish a 
new property right. The DMCA's text indicates that circumvention is not 
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infringement, 17 U.S.C. § 1201(c)(1)(“Nothing in this section shall affect 
rights, remedies, limitations, or defenses to copyright infringement, 
including fair use, under this title.”), and the statute's structure makes the 
point even clearer. This distinction between property and liability is critical. 
Whereas copyrights, like patents, are property, liability protection from 
unauthorized circumvention merely creates a new cause of action under 
which a defendant may be liable. The distinction between property and 
liability goes straight to the issue of authorization, the issue upon which the 
District Court both denied Chamberlain's and granted Skylink's motion for 
summary judgment. 
 
A plaintiff alleging copyright infringement need prove only “(1) 
ownership of a valid copyright, and (2) copying of constituent elements of 
the work that are original.” Feist Pub., Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 
340, 361 (1991). “[T]he existence of a license, exclusive or nonexclusive, 
creates an affirmative defense to a claim of copyright infringement.” I.A.E., 
Inc. v. Shaver, 74 F.3d 768, 775 (7th Cir.1996). In other words, under 
Seventh Circuit copyright law, a plaintiff only needs to show that the 
defendant has used her property; the burden of proving that the use was 
authorized falls squarely on the defendant. Id. The DMCA, 
however, defines circumvention as an activity undertaken “without the 
authority of the copyright owner.” 17 U.S.C. § 1201(a)(3)(A). The plain 
language of the statute therefore requires a plaintiff alleging circumvention 
(or trafficking) to prove that the defendant's access was unauthorized-a 
significant burden where, as here, the copyright laws authorize consumers 
to use the copy of Chamberlain's software embedded in the GDOs that they 
purchased. The premise underlying this initial assignment of burden is that 
the copyright laws authorize members of the public to access a work, but 
not to copy it. The law therefore places the burden of proof on the party 
attempting to establish that the circumstances of its case deviate from these 
normal expectations; defendants must prove authorized copying and 
plaintiffs must prove unauthorized access. 
 
The distinction between property and liability also addresses an 
important policy issue that Chamberlain puts into stark focus….  
Chamberlain contends that Congress empowered manufacturers to prohibit 
consumers from using embedded software products in conjunction with 
competing products when it passed § 1201(a)(1). According to 
Chamberlain, all such uses of products containing copyrighted software to 
which a technological measure controlled access are now per se illegal 
under the DMCA unless the manufacturer provided consumers 
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with explicit authorization. Chamberlain's interpretation of the DMCA 
would therefore grant manufacturers broad exemptions from both the 
antitrust laws and the doctrine of copyright misuse. 
 
Such an exemption, however, is only plausible if the 
anticircumvention provisions established a new property right capable of 
conflicting with the copyright owner's other legal responsibilities-which as 
we have already explained, they do not. The anticircumvention provisions 
convey no additional property rights in and of themselves; they simply 
provide property owners with new ways to secure their property. Like all 
property owners taking legitimate steps to protect their property, however, 
copyright owners relying on the anticircumvention provisions remain bound 
by all other relevant bodies of law. Contrary to Chamberlain's assertion, the 
DMCA emphatically did not “fundamentally alter” the legal landscape 
governing the reasonable expectations of consumers or competitors; did 
not “fundamentally alter” the ways that courts analyze industry practices; 
and did not render the pre-DMCA history of the GDO industry 
irrelevant….. 
 
The [DMCA] contains three provisions targeted at the 
circumvention of technological protections. The first is subsection 
1201(a)(1)(A), the anticircumvention provision. This provision prohibits a 
person from circumvent [ing] a technological measure that effectively 
controls access to a work protected under [Title 17, governing copyright]....  
The second and third provisions are subsections 1201(a)(2) and 1201(b)(1), 
the anti-trafficking provisions.... Subsection 1201(a)(1) differs from both of 
these anti-trafficking subsections in that it targets the use of a circumvention 
technology, not the trafficking in such a technology…. 
 
Prior to the DMCA, a copyright owner would have had no cause of 
action against anyone who circumvented any sort of technological control, 
but did not infringe. The DMCA rebalanced these interests to favor the 
copyright owner; the DMCA created circumvention liability for “digital 
trespass” under § 1201(a)(1). It also created trafficking liability under § 
1201(a)(2) for facilitating such circumvention and under § 1201(b) for 
facilitating infringement (both subject to the numerous limitations and 
exceptions outlined throughout the DMCA). 
 
[A lengthy discussion of the legislative history of the DMCA and earlier 
decisions is omitted] 
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The proper construction of § 1201(a)(2) therefore makes it clear that 
Chamberlain cannot prevail. A plaintiff alleging a violation of § 
1201(a)(2) must prove: (1) ownership of a valid copyright on a work, (2) 
effectively controlled by a technological measure, which has been 
circumvented, (3) that third parties can now access (4) without 
authorization, in a manner that (5) infringes or facilitates infringing a 
right protected by the Copyright Act, because of a product that (6) the 
defendant either (i) designed or produced primarily for circumvention; (ii) 
made available despite only limited commercial significance other than 
circumvention; or (iii) marketed for use in circumvention of the controlling 
technological measure. A plaintiff incapable of establishing any one of 
elements (1) through (5) will have failed to prove a prima facie case. A 
plaintiff capable of proving elements (1) through (5) need prove only one of 
(6)(i), (ii), or (iii) to shift the burden back to the defendant. At that point, the 
various affirmative defenses enumerated throughout § 1201 become 
relevant…. 
 
Chamberlain, however, has failed to show not only the requisite lack 
of authorization, but also the necessary fifth element of its claim, the critical 
nexus between access and protection. Chamberlain neither alleged 
copyright infringement nor explained how the access provided by the Model 
39 transmitter facilitates the infringement of any right that the Copyright 
Act protects. There can therefore be no reasonable relationship between the 
access that homeowners gain to Chamberlain's copyrighted software when 
using Skylink's Model 39 transmitter and the protections that the Copyright 
Act grants to Chamberlain. The Copyright Act authorized Chamberlain's 
customers to use the copy of Chamberlain's copyrighted software embedded 
in the GDOs that they purchased. Chamberlain's customers are therefore 
immune from § 1201(a)(1) circumvention liability. In the absence of 
allegations of either copyright infringement or § 1201(a)(1) circumvention, 
Skylink cannot be liable for § 1201(a)(2) trafficking. The District Court's 
grant of summary judgment in Skylink's favor was correct. Chamberlain 
failed to allege a claim under 17 U.S.C. § 1201. 
 
The DMCA does not create a new property right for copyright 
owners. Nor, for that matter, does it divest the public of the property rights 
that the Copyright Act has long granted to the public. The 
anticircumvention and anti-trafficking provisions of the DMCA create new 
grounds of liability. A copyright owner seeking to impose liability on an 
accused circumventor must demonstrate a reasonable relationship between 
the circumvention at issue and a use relating to a property right for which 
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the Copyright Act permits the copyright owner to withhold authorization-as 
well as notice that authorization was withheld. A copyright owner seeking 
to impose liability on an accused trafficker must demonstrate that the 
trafficker's device enables either copyright infringement or a prohibited 
circumvention. Here, the District Court correctly ruled that Chamberlain 
pled no connection between unauthorized use of its copyrighted software 
and Skylink's accused transmitter. This connection is critical to sustaining a 
cause of action under the DMCA. We therefore affirm the District Court's 
summary judgment in favor of Skylink. 
 
 
NOTES AND QUESTIONS 
 
1.  The Digital Millennium Copyright Act (DMCA) became law in 1998 as 
a way to implement treaties signed at the World Intellectual Property 
Organization Geneva Conference in December 1996.  Consider how much 
of copyright law today is governed by the DMCA.  How many copyright 
issues involve technology that is only a few years old?  What would 
copyright law have been without the DMCA? See Jennifer E. Markiewicz, 
Seeking Shelter from the MP3 Storm: How far does the Digital Millennium 
Copyright Act Online Service Provider Liability Limitation Reach?, 7 
COMMLAW CONSPECTUS 423 (1999). 
 
2.  The court in Chamberlain held that 17 U.S.C. § 1201 only prohibits 
circumvention that infringes or facilitates infringement of an underlying 
exclusive right under the copyright Act.  As the court stated, “Prior to the 
DMCA, a copyright owner would have had no cause of action against 
anyone who circumvented any sort of technological control, but did not 
infringe. The DMCA rebalanced these interests to favor the copyright 
owner; the DMCA created circumvention liability for ‘digital trespass' 
under § 1201(a)(1).” See Alan Galloway, Preserving Competition for 
Computer Maintenance in the DMCA Era: 17 U.S.C. § 1201(A)(1) After 
StorageTek, 22 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 293, n.157 (2007). What types of acts 
constitute such circumvention?  How would circumvention not facilitate 
infringement? 
 
3.  Moby Dick, Herman Melville’s great novel about the white whale, was 
first published in 1851 and has been in the public domain for over a century.  
Suppose that someone put the text of Moby Dick on a CD-ROM for 
playback purposes with a technological lock to prevent copying.  Someone 
else then cracked the technological lock and made copies of the disc, taking 
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only the public domain text of the novel itself.  What outcome under 
Chamberlain?  Would it matter that there are plenty of alternative sources 
for a public domain copy of Moby Dick without a technological lock?  If 
digitization is costly wouldn’t the copyist be taking a free ride on the CD-
ROM producer’s investment.  Or does that not matter? 
 
4.  In MDY Indus., LLC v. Blizzard Ent’t, Inc., 629 F3d 928 (9
th
 Cir. 2010), 
the Ninth Circuit sharply disagreed with Chamberlain and found liability for 
a DMCA violation even if there was no copyright infringement.  The 
copyright holder sold an on-line role-playing game (World of Warcraft, or 
“WoW”) and the defendant made an automated “bot” that played the early 
levels of the game for a user so that the user could graduate to more 
advanced levels.  WoW’s licensing agreement forbad the use of such bots, 
and the court held that a violation of this agreement supported a breach of 
contract action for violation of the licensee but not an action for copyright 
infringement.  The court then found a DMCA violation, however: 
  
 While we appreciate the policy considerations expressed by the 
Federal Circuit in Chamberlain, we are unable to follow its 
approach because it is contrary to the plain language of the statute. 
In addition, the Federal Circuit failed to recognize the rationale for 
the statutory construction that we have proffered. Also, its approach 
is based on policy concerns that are best directed to Congress in the 
first instance, or for which there appear to be other reasons that do 
not require such a convoluted construction of the statute's 
language…. 
 
 There is significant textual evidence showing Congress's 
intent to create a new anticircumvention right in § 1201(a) distinct 
from infringement. 
 
 Chamberlain relied heavily on policy considerations to 
support its reading of § 1201(a). As a threshold matter, we stress 
that such considerations cannot trump the statute's plain text and 
structure. Even were they permissible considerations in this case, 
however, they would not persuade us to adopt an infringement nexus 
Requirement. Chamberlain feared that § 1201(a) would allow 
companies to leverage their sales into aftermarket monopolies, in 
tension with antitrust law and the doctrine of copyright misuse. 
See Assessment Techs., 350 F.3d at 647 (copyright misuse)). 
Concerning antitrust law, we note that there is no clear issue of anti-
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competitive behavior in this case because Blizzard does not seek to 
put a direct competitor who offers a competing role-playing game 
out of business and the parties have not argued this issue. If a § 
1201(a)(2) defendant in a future case claims that a plaintiff is 
attempting to enforce its DMCA anti-circumvention right in a 
manner that violates antitrust law, we will then consider the 
interplay between this new anti-circumvention right and antitrust 
law….  
 
5.   Takedown Notices. The Digital Millennium Copyright Act deals with 
the problem of sponsoring websites that may post infringing materials.  
Such sites include eBay, YouTube, Facebook, and similar sites that are 
“passive” in the sense that they do not review the copyright status of 
everything their users post on them.  17 U.S.C. 512(c) addresses 
“information residing on systems or networks at the direction of users.” The 
statute describes the procedures copyright owners and their agents must 
employ to provide effective notification to a service provider of allegations 
of infringement on the provider's system or network. These notices are often 
referred to as “Takedown” notices. These notices do not extend liability for 
monetary, injunctive, or other equitable relief to service providers who (1) 
do not have actual knowledge that the material is infringing, (2) is not 
aware of facts or circumstances from which infringing activity is apparent, 
or (3) once obtaining knowledge or awareness of infringement, act 
“expeditiously to remove or disable access to the material. See G. Gervaise 
Davis III, et. al., Limits of the DMCA Section 512(c) Safe Harbor, INTELL. 
PROP. LAW INST. 1063 PLI/Pat 425 (2011).  See Viacom Intern., Inc. v. 
YouTube, Inc., 676 F.3d 19 (2d Cir. 2012) 
 
Some courts have held that copyright holders must consider the fair 
use doctrine before submitting take down notices. Lenz v. Universal Music 
Corp., 572 F.Supp.2d 1150 (N.D. Cal. 2008). In this case, the plaintiff 
posted a video on YouTube of her children dancing to Prince’s hit “Let’s 
Go Crazy.” Only about 20 seconds of the song are actually heard on the 
video. Universal Music, the copyright holder, sent YouTube a take down 
notice in compliance with the DMCA requirements of 17 U.S.C. 512. 
YouTube removed the post and notified the plaintiff of the alleged 
infringement, who in turn sent YouTube a counter-notification claiming fair 
use.  YouTube reposted the video. The plaintiff then sued Universal for 
misrepresentation under the DMCA.  The court found for the plaintiff, 
stating “in order for a copyright owner to proceed under the DMCA with a 
good faith belief that use of the material in the manner complained of is not 
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authorized by the copyright owner, its agent, or the law, the owner must 
evaluate whether the material makes fair use of the copyright.  An 
allegation that a copyright owner acted in bad faith by issuing a takedown 
notice without proper consideration of the fair use doctrine thus is sufficient 
to state a misrepresentation claim pursuant to Section 512(f) of the DMCA." 
 
6.  In Lexmark International v. Static Control Components, 387 F.3d 522 
(6th Cir.2004) the plaintiff sold laser printers that used a microchip to 
ensure that only the manufacturer’s own ink cartridges could be used in the 
printer.  The defendant reverse engineered the microchip and sold it to 
manufacturers of generic ink cartridges for use in Lexmark printers.  The 
Sixth Circuit found no violation of DMCA § 1201(a)(2) claim failed 
because anyone who purchased a printer could “access” the copyrighted 
program and read the code from the printer memory.   As a result reverse 
engineering the chip, which was required for the cartridge to access the 
authentication information, was not required for the reverse engineer 
seeking to emulate the chip.  As a result there was not an effective 
technological lock: 
 
Just as one would not say that a lock on the back door of a house 
“controls access” to a house whose front door does not contain a lock 
and just as one would not say that a lock on any door of a house 
“controls access” to the house after its purchaser receives the key to the 
lock, it does not make sense to say that this provision of the DMCA 
applies to otherwise-readily-accessible copyrighted works. Add to this 
the fact that the DMCA not only requires the technological measure to 
“control access” but requires the measure to control that access 
“effectively,” 17 U.S.C. § 1201(a)(2), and it seems clear that this 
provision does not naturally extend to a technological measure that 
restricts one form of access but leaves another route wide open. 
 
Lexmark also involved exclusion of a competitor by means of a 
“technological tie” (see Chapter two).  Would such a tie have been 
considered anticompetitive under the antitrust laws, thus creating a potential 
conflict between the DMCA and antitrust policy? Are these facts relevant: 
(1) Lexmark is a nondominant printer manufacturer in a moderately 
competitive market together with Hewlitt-Packard, Canon, Epson, and 
others; (2) the tie at issue is variable proportion?  See Chapter 2; and 
HERBERT HOVENKAMP, FEDERAL ANTITRUST POLICY: THE LAW OF 
COMPETITION AND ITS PRACTICE, ch. 10 (4
th
 ed. 2011). 
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ProCD, INC. V. ZEIDENBERG 
86 F.3d 1447 (7th
 
Cir. 1996) 
 
EASTERBROOK, Circuit Judge. 
 
Must buyers of computer software obey the terms of shrinkwrap 
licenses? The district court held not, for two reasons: first, they are not 
contracts because the licenses are inside the box rather than printed on the 
outside; second, federal law forbids enforcement even if the licenses are 
contracts…. [W]e disagree with the district judge’s conclusion on each. 
Shrinkwrap licenses are enforceable unless their terms are objectionable on 
grounds applicable to contracts in general (for example, if they violate a 
rule of positive law, or if they are unconscionable). Because no one argues 
that the terms of the license at issue here are troublesome, we remand with 
instructions to enter judgment for the plaintiff. 
 
ProCD, the plaintiff, has compiled information from more than 
3,000 telephone directories into a computer database. We may assume that 
this database cannot be copyrighted, although it is more complex, contains 
more information (nine-digit zip codes and census industrial codes), is 
organized differently, and therefore is more original than the single 
alphabetical directory at issue in Feist Publications, Inc. v. Rural Telephone 
Service Co., 499 U.S. 340 (1991). See Paul J. Heald, The Vices of 
Originality, 1991 Sup.Ct. Rev. 143, 160-68. ProCD sells a version of the 
database, called SelectPhone (trademark), on CD-ROM discs. (CD-ROM 
means “compact disc-read only memory.) The “shrinkwrap license” gets its 
name from the fact that retail software packages are covered in plastic or 
cellophane “shrinkwrap,” and some vendors, though not ProCD, have 
written licenses that become effective as soon as the customer tears the 
wrapping from the package. Vendors prefer “end user license,” but we use 
the more common term.) A proprietary method of compressing the data 
serves as effective encryption too. Customers decrypt and use the data with 
the aid of an application program that ProCD has written. This program, 
which is copyrighted, searches the database in response to users’ criteria 
(such as “find all people named Tatum in Tennessee, plus all firms with 
‘Door Systems’ in the corporate name”). The resulting lists (or, as ProCD 
prefers, “listings”) can be read and manipulated by other software, such as 
word processing programs. 
 
The database in SelectPhone (trademark) cost more than $10 million 
to compile and is expensive to keep current. It is much more valuable to 
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some users than to others. The combination of names, addresses, and SIC 
codes enables manufacturers to compile lists of potential customers. 
Manufacturers and retailers pay high prices to specialized information 
intermediaries for such mailing lists; ProCD offers a potentially cheaper 
alternative. People with nothing to sell could use the database as a substitute 
for calling long distance information, or as a way to look up old friends who 
have moved to unknown towns, or just as an electronic substitute for the 
local phone book. ProCD decided to engage in price discrimination, selling 
its database to the general public for personal use at a low price 
(approximately $150 for the set of five discs) while selling information to 
the trade for a higher price. It has adopted some intermediate strategies too: 
access to the SelectPhone (trademark) database is available via the America 
Online service for the price America Online charges to its clients 
(approximately $3 per hour), but this service has been tailored to be useful 
only to the general public. 
 
If ProCD had to recover all of its costs and make a profit by 
charging a single price-that is, if it could not charge more to commercial 
users than to the general public-it would have to raise the price substantially 
over $150. The ensuing reduction in sales would harm consumers who 
value the information at, say, $200. They get consumer surplus of $50 under 
the current arrangement but would cease to buy if the price rose 
substantially. If because of high elasticity of demand in the consumer 
segment of the market the only way to make a profit turned out to be a price 
attractive to commercial users alone, then all consumers would lose out-and 
so would the commercial clients, who would have to pay more for the 
listings because ProCD could not obtain any contribution toward costs from 
the consumer market. 
 
To make price discrimination work, however, the seller must be able 
to control arbitrage. An air carrier sells tickets for less to vacationers than to 
business travelers, using advance purchase and Saturday-night-stay 
requirements to distinguish the categories. A producer of movies segments 
the market by time, releasing first to theaters, then to pay-per-view services, 
next to the videotape and laserdisc market, and finally to cable and 
commercial tv. Vendors of computer software have a harder task. Anyone 
can walk into a retail store and buy a box. Customers do not wear tags 
saying “commercial user” or “consumer user.” Anyway, even a 
commercial-user-detector at the door would not work, because a consumer 
could buy the software and resell to a commercial user. That arbitrage 
would break down the price discrimination and drive up the minimum price 
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at which ProCD would sell to anyone. 
 
Instead of tinkering with the product and letting users sort 
themselves-for example, furnishing current data at a high price that would 
be attractive only to commercial customers, and two-year-old data at a low 
price-ProCD turned to the institution of contract. Every box containing its 
consumer product declares that the software comes with restrictions stated 
in an enclosed license. This license, which is encoded on the CD-ROM 
disks as well as printed in the manual, and which appears on a user’s screen 
every time the software runs, limits use of the application program and 
listings to non-commercial purposes. 
 
Matthew Zeidenberg bought a consumer package of SelectPhone 
(trademark) in 1994 from a retail outlet in Madison, Wisconsin, but decided 
to ignore the license. He formed Silken Mountain Web Services, Inc., to 
resell the information in the SelectPhone (trademark) database. The 
corporation makes the database available on the Internet to anyone willing 
to pay its price-which, needless to say, is less than ProCD charges its 
commercial customers. Zeidenberg has purchased two additional 
SelectPhone (trademark) packages, each with an updated version of the 
database, and made the latest information available over the World Wide 
Web, for a price, through his corporation. ProCD filed this suit seeking an 
injunction against further dissemination that exceeds the rights specified in 
the licenses (identical in each of the three packages Zeidenberg purchased). 
The district court held the licenses ineffectual because their terms do not 
appear on the outside of the packages. The court added that the second and 
third licenses stand no different from the first, even though they are 
identical, because they might have been different, and a purchaser does not 
agree to-and cannot be bound by-terms that were secret at the time of 
purchase. 908 F.Supp. at 654. 
 
Following the district court, we treat the licenses as ordinary 
contracts accompanying the sale of products, and therefore as governed by 
the common law of contracts and the Uniform Commercial Code. Whether 
there are legal differences between “contracts” and “licenses” (which may 
matter under the copyright doctrine of first sale) is a subject for another 
day….  Zeidenberg does not argue that Silken Mountain Web Services is 
free of any restrictions that apply to Zeidenberg himself, because any effort 
to treat the two parties as distinct would put Silken Mountain behind the 
eight ball on ProCD’s argument that copying the application program onto 
its hard disk violates the copyright laws. Zeidenberg does argue, and the 
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district court held, that placing the package of software on the shelf is an 
“offer,” which the customer “accepts” by paying the asking price and 
leaving the store with the goods.  In Wisconsin, as elsewhere, a contract 
includes only the terms on which the parties have agreed. One cannot agree 
to hidden terms, the judge concluded. So far, so good-but one of the terms 
to which Zeidenberg agreed by purchasing the software is that the 
transaction was subject to a license. Zeidenberg’s position therefore must be 
that the printed terms on the outside of a box are the parties’ contract-except 
for printed terms that refer to or incorporate other terms. But why would 
Wisconsin fetter the parties’ choice in this way? Vendors can put the entire 
terms of a contract on the outside of a box only by using microscopic type, 
removing other information that buyers might find more useful (such as 
what the software does, and on which computers it works), or both. The 
“Read Me” file included with most software, describing system 
requirements and potential incompatibilities, may be equivalent to ten pages 
of type; warranties and license restrictions take still more space. Notice on 
the outside, terms on the inside, and a right to return the software for a 
refund if the terms are unacceptable (a right that the license expressly 
extends), may be a means of doing business valuable to buyers and sellers 
alike. See E. Allan Farnsworth, 1 Farnsworth on Contracts § 4.26 (1990); 
Restatement (2d) of Contracts § 211 comment a (1981) (“Standardization of 
agreements serves many of the same functions as standardization of goods 
and services; both are essential to a system of mass production and 
distribution. Scarce and costly time and skill can be devoted to a class of 
transactions rather than the details of individual transactions.”). Doubtless a 
state could forbid the use of standard contracts in the software business, but 
we do not think that Wisconsin has done so. 
 
Transactions in which the exchange of money precedes the 
communication of detailed terms are common. Consider the purchase of 
insurance. The buyer goes to an agent, who explains the essentials (amount 
of coverage, number of years) and remits the premium to the home office, 
which sends back a policy. On the district judge’s understanding, the terms 
of the policy are irrelevant because the insured paid before receiving them. 
Yet the device of payment, often with a “binder” (so that the insurance takes 
effect immediately even though the home office reserves the right to 
withdraw coverage later), in advance of the policy, serves buyers’ interests 
by accelerating effectiveness and reducing transactions costs. Or consider 
the purchase of an airline ticket. The traveler calls the carrier or an agent, is 
quoted a price, reserves a seat, pays, and gets a ticket, in that order. The 
ticket contains elaborate terms, which the traveler can reject by canceling 
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the reservation. To use the ticket is to accept the terms, even terms that in 
retrospect are disadvantageous. See Carnival Cruise Lines, Inc. v. Shute, 
499 U.S. 585 (1991); see also Vimar Seguros y Reaseguros, S.A. v. M/V Sky 
Reefer, 515 U.S. 528 (1995) (bills of lading). Just so with a ticket to a 
concert. The back of the ticket states that the patron promises not to record 
the concert; to attend is to agree. A theater that detects a violation will 
confiscate the tape and escort the violator to the exit. One could arrange 
things so that every concertgoer signs this promise before forking over the 
money, but that cumbersome way of doing things not only would lengthen 
queues and raise prices but also would scotch the sale of tickets by phone or 
electronic data service. 
 
Consumer goods work the same way. Someone who wants to buy a 
radio set visits a store, pays, and walks out with a box. Inside the box is a 
leaflet containing some terms, the most important of which usually is the 
warranty, read for the first time in the comfort of home. By Zeidenberg’s 
lights, the warranty in the box is irrelevant; every consumer gets the 
standard warranty implied by the UCC in the event the contract is silent; yet 
so far as we are aware no state disregards warranties furnished with 
consumer products. Drugs come with a list of ingredients on the outside and 
an elaborate package insert on the inside. The package insert describes drug 
interactions, contraindications, and other vital information-but, if 
Zeidenberg is right, the purchaser need not read the package insert, because 
it is not part of the contract. 
 
Next consider the software industry itself. Only a minority of sales 
take place over the counter, where there are boxes to peruse. A customer 
may place an order by phone in response to a line item in a catalog or a 
review in a magazine. Much software is ordered over the Internet by 
purchasers who have never seen a box. Increasingly software arrives by 
wire. There is no box; there is only a stream of electrons, a collection of 
information that includes data, an application program, instructions, many 
limitations (“MegaPixel 3.14159 cannot be used with BytePusher 2.718”), 
and the terms of sale. The user purchases a serial number, which activates 
the software’s features. On Zeidenberg’s arguments, these unboxed sales 
are unfettered by terms-so the seller has made a broad warranty and must 
pay consequential damages for any shortfalls in performance, two 
“promises” that if taken seriously would drive prices through the ceiling or 
return transactions to the horse-and-buggy age…..] 
 
What then does the current version of the UCC have to say? We 
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think that the place to start is § 2-204(1): “A contract for sale of goods may 
be made in any manner sufficient to show agreement, including conduct by 
both parties which recognizes the existence of such a contract.” A vendor, 
as master of the offer, may invite acceptance by conduct, and may propose 
limitations on the kind of conduct that constitutes acceptance. A buyer may 
accept by performing the acts the vendor proposes to treat as acceptance. 
And that is what happened. ProCD proposed a contract that a buyer would 
accept by using the software after having an opportunity to read the license 
at leisure. This Zeidenberg did. He had no choice, because the software 
splashed the license on the screen and would not let him proceed without 
indicating acceptance. So although the district judge was right to say that a 
contract can be, and often is, formed simply by paying the price and 
walking out of the store, the UCC permits contracts to be formed in other 
ways. ProCD proposed such a different way, and without protest 
Zeidenberg agreed. Ours is not a case in which a consumer opens a package 
to find an insert saying “you owe us an extra $10,000” and the seller files 
suit to collect. Any buyer finding such a demand can prevent formation of 
the contract by returning the package, as can any consumer who concludes 
that the terms of the license make the software worth less than the purchase 
price. Nothing in the UCC requires a seller to maximize the buyer’s net 
gains…. 
 
The district court held that, even if Wisconsin treats shrinkwrap 
licenses as contracts, § 301(a) of the Copyright Act, 17 U.S.C. § 301(a), 
prevents their enforcement. The relevant part of § 301(a) preempts any 
“legal or equitable rights [under state law] that are equivalent to any of the 
exclusive rights within the general scope of copyright as specified by 
section 106 in works of authorship that are fixed in a tangible medium of 
expression and come within the subject matter of copyright as specified by 
sections 102 and 103”. ProCD’s software and data are “fixed in a tangible 
medium of expression”, and the district judge held that they are “within the 
subject matter of copyright”. The latter conclusion is plainly right for the 
copyrighted application program, and the judge thought that the data 
likewise are “within the subject matter of copyright” even if, after Feist, 
they are not sufficiently original to be copyrighted. Baltimore Orioles, Inc. 
v. Major League Baseball Players Ass’n, 805 F.2d 663, 676 (7th Cir.1986), 
supports that conclusion, with which commentators agree…. 
 
But are rights created by contract “equivalent to any of the exclusive 
rights within the general scope of copyright”?...  Rights “equivalent to any 
of the exclusive rights within the general scope of copyright” are rights 
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established by law-rights that restrict the options of persons who are 
strangers to the author. Copyright law forbids duplication, public 
performance, and so on, unless the person wishing to copy or perform the 
work gets permission; silence means a ban on copying. A copyright is a 
right against the world. Contracts, by contrast, generally affect only their 
parties; strangers may do as they please, so contracts do not create 
“exclusive rights.” Someone who found a copy of SelectPhone (trademark) 
on the street would not be affected by the shrinkwrap license-though the 
federal copyright laws of their own force would limit the finder’s ability to 
copy or transmit the application program. 
 
 … Suppose ProCD hires a firm to scour the nation for telephone 
directories, promising to pay $100 for each that ProCD does not already 
have. The firm locates 100 new directories, which it sends to ProCD with an 
invoice for $10,000. ProCD incorporates the directories into its database; 
does it have to pay the bill? Surely yes; Aronson v. Quick Point Pencil Co., 
440 U.S. 257 (1979), holds that promises to pay for intellectual property 
may be enforced even though federal law (in Aronson, the patent law) offers 
no protection against third-party uses of that property.  ProCD offers 
software and data for two prices: one for personal use, a higher price for 
commercial use. Zeidenberg wants to use the data without paying the 
seller’s price; if the law student and Quick Point Pencil Co. could not do 
that, neither can Zeidenberg. 
 
Aronson emphasized that enforcement of the contract between 
Aronson and Quick Point Pencil Company would not withdraw any 
information from the public domain. That is equally true of the contract 
between ProCD and Zeidenberg. Everyone remains free to copy and 
disseminate all 3,000 telephone books that have been incorporated into 
ProCD’s database. Anyone can add SIC codes and zip codes. ProCD’s 
rivals have done so. Enforcement of the shrinkwrap license may even make 
information more readily available, by reducing the price ProCD charges to 
consumer buyers. To the extent licenses facilitate distribution of object code 
while concealing the source code (the point of a clause forbidding 
disassembly), they serve the same procompetitive functions as does the law 
of trade secrets.  Licenses may have other benefits for consumers: many 
licenses permit users to make extra copies, to use the software on multiple 
computers, even to incorporate the software into the user’s products. But 
whether a particular license is generous or restrictive, a simple two-party 
contract is not “equivalent to any of the exclusive rights within the general 
scope of copyright” and therefore may be enforced. 
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. 
NOTES AND QUESTIONS 
 
1.  The 7
th
 Circuit  concluded that the contract does not necessarily have to 
be formed when the buyer pays for the software box, but can also be formed 
when the buyer reads the license after purchase. This decision is regarded to 
have reversed the general consensus among the U.S. courts in which shrink-
wrap agreements were generally held as invalid. See Mo Zang, Contractual 
Choice of Law in Contracts of Adhesion and Party Autonomy, 41 Akron L. 
Rev. 123, 128 (2008).  Under contract law what would make such terms 
objectionable?  If such terms were objectionable, what rights would the 
purchaser have?  Since copyright is applicable to the entire world, and 
contracts bind only those in privity, what effect would copyright law have 
on the rights of the purchaser?  See also Mark Andrew Cerny, A Shield 
Against Arbitration: U.C.C. Section 2-207’s Role in the Enforceability of 
Arbitration Agreements Included with Delivery of Products, 51 Ala. L. Rev. 
821 (2000).  Cf. Schnabel v. Trilegiant Corp., 697 F.3d 110 (2d Cir. 2012), 
which concluded that an email sent to customers who had previously 
purchased an online marketing program did not provide sufficient notice of 
a compulsory arbitration provision described in the email: " A person can 
assent to terms even if he or she does not actually read them, but the “offer 
[must nonetheless] make clear to [a reasonable] consumer” both that terms 
are being presented and that they can be adopted through the conduct that 
the offeror alleges constituted assent... We do not think that an unsolicited 
email from an online consumer business puts recipients on inquiry notice of 
the terms enclosed in that email and those terms' relationship to a service in 
which the recipients had already enrolled, and that a failure to act 
affirmatively to cancel the membership will, alone, constitute assent." 
 
II.  ANTITRUST AND COPYRIGHT EXCLUSION 
 
PROF’L REAL EST. INVEST., INC. v. COLUMBIA PICTURES 
INDUS., INC. 
508 U.S. 49 (1993) 
 
JUSTICE THOMAS delivered the opinion of the Court.   
 
This case requires us to define the ``sham’’ exception to the doctrine 
of antitrust immunity first identified in Eastern R. Presidents Conference v. 
Noerr Motor Freight, Inc., 365 U.S. 127 (1961), as that doctrine applies in 
the litigation context. Under the sham exception, activity ``ostensibly 
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directed toward influencing governmental action’’ does not qualify for 
Noerr immunity if it ``is a mere sham to cover ... an attempt to interfere 
directly with the business relationships of a competitor.’’ We hold that 
litigation cannot be deprived of immunity as a sham unless the litigation is 
objectively baseless....  
 
Petitioners Professional Real Estate Investors, Inc., and Kenneth F. 
Irwin (collectively, PRE) operated La Mancha Private Club and Villas, a 
resort hotel in Palm Springs, California. Having installed videodisc players 
in the resort’s hotel rooms and assembled a library of more than 200 motion 
picture titles, PRE rented videodiscs to guests for in-room viewing... .  
Respondents, Columbia Pictures Industries, Inc., and seven other major 
motion picture studios (collectively, Columbia), held copyrights to the 
motion pictures recorded on the videodiscs that PRE purchased. Columbia 
also licensed the transmission of copyrighted motion pictures to hotel rooms 
through a wired cable system called Spectradyne. PRE therefore competed 
with Columbia not only for the viewing market at La Mancha but also for 
the broader market for in-room entertainment services in hotels. In 1983, 
Columbia sued PRE for alleged copyright infringement through the rental 
of videodiscs for viewing in hotel rooms. PRE counterclaimed, charging 
Columbia with violations of §§ 1 and 2 of the Sherman Act....  In particular, 
PRE alleged that Columbia’s copyright action was a mere sham that 
cloaked underlying acts of monopolization and conspiracy to restrain 
trade... 
 
Columbia did not dispute that PRE could freely sell or lease lawfully 
purchased videodiscs under the Copyright Act’s ``first sale’’ doctrine….  
[S]ummary judgment depended solely on whether rental of videodiscs for 
in-room viewing infringed Columbia’s exclusive right to ``perform the 
copyrighted work[s] publicly.’’ Ruling that such rental did not constitute 
public performance, the District Court entered summary judgment for PRE. 
The Court of Appeals affirmed on the grounds that a hotel room was not a 
``public place’’ and that PRE did not ``transmit or otherwise communicate’’ 
Columbia’s motion pictures.   
 
On remand, Columbia sought summary judgment on PRE’s antitrust 
claims, arguing that the original copyright infringement action was no sham 
and was therefore entitled to immunity under [Noerr]... .  [T]he District 
Court granted the motion: ``It was clear from the manner in which the case 
was presented that [Columbia was] seeking and expecting a favorable 
judgment... .’’ The Court of Appeals affirmed ..., [reasoning] that the 
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existence of probable cause ``preclude[d] the application of the sham 
exception as a matter of law’’ because ``a suit brought with probable cause 
does not fall within the sham exception to the Noerr-Pennington doctrine.’’ 
Finally, the court observed that PRE’s failure to show that ``the copyright 
infringement action was baseless’’ rendered irrelevant any ``evidence of 
[Columbia’s] subjective intent.’’ It accordingly rejected PRE’s request for 
further discovery on Columbia’s intent... .  
 
PRE contends that ``the Ninth Circuit erred in holding that an 
antitrust plaintiff must, as a threshold prerequisite ..., establish that a sham 
lawsuit is baseless as a matter of law.’’ It invites us to adopt an approach 
under which either ``indifference to ... outcome,’ or failure to prove that a 
petition for redress of grievances ``would ... have been brought but for [a] 
predatory motive,’’ would expose a defendant to antitrust liability under the 
sham exception. We decline PRE’s invitation. Those who petition 
government for redress are generally immune from antitrust liability. We 
first recognized in Noerr that ``the Sherman Act does not prohibit ... 
persons from associating together in an attempt to persuade the legislature 
or the executive to take particular action with respect to a law that would 
produce a restraint or a   monopoly.’’... In light of the government’s ``power 
to act in [its] representative capacity’’ and ``to take actions ... that operate to 
restrain trade,’’ we reasoned that the Sherman Act does not punish 
``political activity’’ through which ``the people ... freely inform the 
government of their wishes.’’ Nor did we ``impute to Congress an intent to 
invade’’ the First Amendment right to petition. Noerr, however, withheld 
immunity from ``sham’’ activities because ``application of the Sherman Act 
would be justified’’ when petitioning activity, ``ostensibly directed toward 
influencing governmental action, is a mere sham to cover ... an attempt to 
interfere directly with the business relationships of a competitor.’’ In Noerr 
itself, we found that a publicity campaign by railroads seeking legislation 
harmful to truckers was no sham in that the ``effort to influence legislation’’ 
was ``not only genuine but also highly successful.’’ 
   
Our original formulation of antitrust petitioning immunity required 
that unprotected activity lack objective reasonableness. Noerr rejected the 
contention that an attempt ``to influence the passage and enforcement of 
laws’’ might lose immunity merely because the lobbyists’ ``sole purpose ... 
was to destroy [their] competitors.’’... ``Noerr shields from the Sherman 
Act a concerted effort to influence public officials regardless of intent or 
purpose.’’   
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…  [W]e have consistently assumed that the sham exception 
contains an indispensable objective component. We have described a sham 
as ``evidenced by repetitive lawsuits carrying the hallmark of insubstantial 
claims.’’ Otter Tail Power Co. v. United States, 410 U.S. 366, 380 (1973) 
(emphasis added). We regard as sham ``private action that is not genuinely 
aimed at procuring favorable government action,’’ as opposed to ``a valid 
effort to influence government   action.’’ Allied Tube & Conduit Corp. v. 
Indian Head, Inc., 486 U.S. 492, 500, n. 4 (1988). And we have explicitly 
observed that a successful ``effort to influence governmental action ... 
certainly cannot be characterized as a sham.’’... 
 
... In Columbia v. Omni Outdoor Advertising, Inc., 499 U.S. 365 
(1991), we similarly held that challenges to allegedly sham petitioning 
activity must be resolved according to objective criteria. We dispelled the 
notion that an antitrust plaintiff could prove a sham merely by showing that 
its competitor’s ``purposes were to delay [the plaintiff’s] entry into the 
market and even to deny it a meaningful access to the appropriate ... 
administrative and legislative fora.’’...  
 
We now outline a two-part definition of ``sham’’ litigation. First, the 
lawsuit must be objectively baseless in the sense that no reasonable litigant 
could realistically expect success on the merits. If an objective litigant could 
conclude that the suit is reasonably calculated to elicit a favorable outcome, 
the suit is immunized under Noerr, and an antitrust claim premised on the 
sham exception must fail. Only if challenged litigation is objectively 
meritless may a court examine the litigant’s subjective motivation. Under 
this second part of our definition of sham, the court should focus on 
whether the baseless lawsuit conceals ``an attempt to interfere directly with 
the business relationships of a competitor.”…  
 
Of course, even a plaintiff who defeats the defendant’s claim to 
Noerr immunity by demonstrating both the objective and the subjective 
components of a sham must still prove a substantive antitrust violation. 
Proof of a sham merely deprives the defendant of immunity; it does not 
relieve the plaintiff of the obligation to establish all other elements of his 
claim... .  
 
We conclude that the Court of Appeals properly affirmed summary 
judgment for Columbia on PRE’s antitrust counterclaim. Under the 
objective prong of the sham exception, the Court of Appeals correctly held 
that sham litigation must constitute the pursuit of claims so baseless that no 
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reasonable litigant could realistically expect to secure favorable relief. The 
existence of probable cause to institute legal proceedings precludes a 
finding that an antitrust defendant has engaged in sham litigation. The 
notion of probable cause, as understood and applied in the common law tort 
of wrongful civil proceedings, requires the plaintiff to prove that the 
defendant lacked probable cause to institute an unsuccessful civil lawsuit 
and that the defendant pressed the action for an improper, malicious 
purpose... .  Probable cause to institute civil proceedings requires no more 
than a ``reasonabl[e] belie[f] that there is a chance that [a] claim may be 
held valid upon adjudication’’  Because the absence of probable cause is an 
essential element of the tort, the existence of probable cause is an absolute 
defense... .   
 
Just as evidence of anticompetitive intent cannot affect the objective 
prong of Noerr’s sham exception, a showing of malice alone will neither 
entitle the wrongful civil proceedings plaintiff to prevail nor permit the 
factfinder to infer the absence of probable cause. When a court has found 
that an antitrust defendant claiming Noerr immunity had probable cause to 
sue, that finding compels the conclusion that a reasonable litigant in the 
defendant’s position could realistically expect success on the merits of the 
challenged lawsuit. Under our decision today, therefore, a proper probable 
cause determination irrefutably demonstrates that an antitrust plaintiff has 
not proved the objective prong of the sham exception and that the defendant 
is accordingly entitled to Noerr immunity... .  Columbia enjoyed the 
``exclusive righ[t] ... to perform [its] copyrighted’’ motion pictures 
``publicly.’ Regardless of whether it intended any monopolistic or predatory 
use, Columbia acquired this statutory right... .  Indeed, to condition a 
copyright upon a demonstrated lack of anticompetitive intent would upset 
the notion of copyright as a ``limited grant’’ of ``monopoly   privileges’’ 
intended simultaneously ``to motivate the creative activity of authors’’ and 
``to give the public appropriate access to their work product.’  
 
When the District Court entered summary judgment for PRE on 
Columbia’s copyright claim in 1986, it was by no means clear whether 
PRE’s videodisc rental activities intruded on Columbia’s copyrights. At that 
time, the Third Circuit and a District Court within the Third Circuit had 
held that the rental of video cassettes for viewing in on-site, private 
screening rooms infringed on the copyright owner’s right of public 
performance….The Seventh Circuit expressly ``decline[d] to follow’’ the 
Ninth Circuit and adopted instead the Third Circuit’s definition of a ``public 
place.’’ Video Views, Inc. v. Studio 21, Ltd., 925 F.2d 1010, 1020, cert. 
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denied, 502 U.S. (1991). In light of the unsettled condition of the law, 
Columbia plainly had probable cause to sue. Any reasonable copyright 
owner in Columbia’s position could have believed that it had some chance 
of winning an infringement suit against PRE. Even though it did not survive 
PRE’s motion for summary judgment, Columbia’s copyright action was 
arguably ``warranted by existing law’’ or at the very least was based on an 
objectively ``good faith argument for the extension, modification, or 
reversal of existing law.’’ Fed. Rule Civ. Proc. 11 ... .  A court could 
reasonably conclude that Columbia’s infringement action was an 
objectively plausible effort to enforce rights. Accordingly, we conclude that 
PRE failed to establish the objective prong of Noerr’s sham exception.   
 
Finally, the Court of Appeals properly refused PRE’s request for 
further discovery on the economic circumstances of the underlying 
copyright   litigation. As we have held, PRE could not pierce Columbia’s 
Noerr immunity without proof that Columbia’s infringement action was 
objectively baseless or frivolous. Thus, the District Court had no occasion 
to inquire whether Columbia was indifferent to the outcome on the merits of 
the copyright suit, whether any damages for infringement would be too low 
to justify Columbia’s investment in the suit, or whether Columbia had 
decided to sue primarily for the benefit of collateral injuries inflicted 
through the use of legal process. Such matters concern Columbia’s 
economic motivations in bringing suit, which were rendered irrelevant by 
the objective legal reasonableness of the litigation. The existence of 
probable cause eliminated any ``genuine issue as to any material fact,’’ Fed. 
Rule Civ. Proc. 56(c), and summary judgment properly issued. We affirm 
the judgment of the Court of Appeals.  
 
So ordered.  
 
JUSTICE STEVENS, with whom JUSTICE O’CONNOR joins, 
concurring in the judgment.   
 
... I disagree with the Court’s equation of ``objectively baseless’’ 
with the answer to the question whether any ``reasonable litigant could 
realistically expect success on the merits.’’ There might well be lawsuits 
that fit the latter definition but can be shown to be objectively unreasonable, 
and thus shams... 
 
... The label ``sham’’ [might] apply to a plaintiff who had some reason 
to expect success on the merits but because of its tremendous cost would 
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not bother to achieve that result without the benefit of collateral injuries 
imposed on its competitor by the legal process alone. Litigation filed or 
pursued for such collateral purposes is fundamentally different from a case 
in which the relief sought in the litigation itself would give the plaintiff a 
competitive advantage or, perhaps, exclude a potential competitor from 
entering a market with a product that either infringes the plaintiff’s patent or 
copyright or violates an exclusive franchise granted by a governmental 
body. The case before us today is in the latter, obviously legitimate, 
category. There was no unethical or other improper use of the judicial 
system; instead, respondents invoked the federal court’s jurisdiction to 
determine whether they could lawfully restrain competition with petitioners. 
The relief they sought in their original action, if granted, would have had 
the anticompetitive consequences authorized by federal copyright law... .   
 
Repetitive filings, some of which are successful and some 
unsuccessful, may support an inference that the process is being misused. 
California Motor Transport Co. v. Trucking Unlimited, 404 U.S. 508 
(1972). In such a case, a rule that a single meritorious action can never 
constitute a sham cannot be dispositive. Moreover, a simple rule may be 
hard to apply when there is evidence that the judicial process has been used 
as part of a larger program to control a market and to interfere with a 
potential competitor’s financing without any interest in the outcome of the 
lawsuit itself, see Otter Tail Power Co. v. United States, 410 U.S. 366, 379, 
n. 9 (1973); Westmac, Inc. v. Smith, 797 F.2d 313, 322 (6th Cir. 1986) 
(Merritt, C. J., dissenting). It is in more complex cases that courts have 
required a more sophisticated analysis - one going beyond   a mere 
evaluation of the merits of a single claim. In one such case Judge Posner 
made the following observations about the subtle distinction between suing 
a competitor to get damages and filing a lawsuit only in the hope that the 
expense and burden of defending it will make the defendant abandon its 
competitive behavior:“   
 
But we are not prepared to rule that the difficulty of distinguishing 
lawful from unlawful purpose in litigation between competitors is so acute 
that such litigation can never be considered an actionable restraint of trade, 
provided it has some, though perhaps only threadbare, basis in law. Many 
claims not wholly groundless would never be sued on for their own sake; 
the stakes, discounted by the probability of winning, would be too low to 
repay the investment in litigation. Suppose a monopolist brought a tort 
action against its single, tiny competitor; the action had a colorable basis in 
law; but in fact the monopolist would never have brought the suit - its 
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chances of winning, or the damages it could hope to get if it did win, were 
too small compared to what it would have to spend on the litigation - except 
that it wanted to use pretrial discovery to discover its competitor’s trade 
secrets; or hoped that the competitor would be required to make public 
disclosure of its potential liability in the suit and that this disclosure would 
increase the interest rate that the competitor had to pay for bank financing; 
or just wanted to impose heavy legal costs on the competitor in the hope of 
deterring entry by other firms. In these examples the plaintiff wants to hurt 
a competitor not by getting a judgment against him, which would be a 
proper objective, but just by the maintenance of the suit, regardless of its 
outcome... .  [W]e think it is premature to hold that litigation, unless 
malicious in the tort sense, can never be actionable under the antitrust laws. 
The existence of a tort of abuse of process shows that it has long been 
thought that litigation could be used for improper purposes even when there 
is probable cause for the litigation; and if the improper purpose is to use 
litigation as a tool for suppressing competition in its antitrust sense, ... it 
becomes a matter of antitrust concern.” 
 
NOTES AND QUESTIONS 
 
1.  How does the “sham” lawsuit doctrine of PREI differ from the Walker 
Process doctrine for improper patent infringement claims discussed in 
Chapter 4.  One important difference is that copyrights are rarely obtained 
in the first instance by fraude or inequitable conduct before the Patent 
Office.  In this case no one was questioning the validity of Columbia’s 
copyrights, but only its right to bring an infringement suit.  Does that 
change the nature of the game?  Perhaps in one relatively significant way.  
Fraud on the Patent Office may be known by the patent applicant but not 
readily discoverable by third parties.  By contrast, when the issue is a 
disputed question of law, as in PREI, then both sides have access to the 
same information. 
2.  The idea of “sham lawsuits” as antitrust violations originated in Eastern 
R.R. Presidents Conf. v. Noerr Motor Freight Inc., 365 U.S. 127 (1961).  
The idea was that “There may be situations in which a publicity campaign, 
ostensibly directed toward influencing governmental action, is a mere sham 
to cover what is actually nothing more than an attempt to interfere directly 
with the business relationships of a competitor.” Id. at 144.  However, PRE 
limited the applicability of “sham lawsuits” by requiring that the suit must 
be proven to be “objectively baseless” under an objective standard.  What is 
the effect of requiring such proof for “sham” lawsuits?  How does this 
limitation affect the frequency of such lawsuits?   Doesn’t the tort of 
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malicious prosecution sanction such lawsuits sufficiently, without 
antitrust’s treble damages?  See 1 PHILLIP E. AREEDA &  HERBERT 
HOVENKAMP, ANTITRUST LAW ¶¶ 201-207 (4th ed. 2013). 
 
PADDOCK PUBLICATIONS, INC. v. CHICAGO TRIBUNE 
COMPANY 
103 F.3d 42 (7
th
 Cir. 1996) 
 
EASTERBROOK, Circuit Judge: 
 
Newspapers' content has many sources. To the work of their own staff, 
papers add dispatches from syndicated news services such as the Associated 
Press and Reuters that station reporters or stringers across the globe. 
Leading newspapers such as the New York Times, the Los Angeles Times, 
the Washington Post, the Chicago Tribune, and the Wall Street Journal 
have set up supplemental news services. The New York Times News 
Service carries that paper's stories; the Los Angeles Times/Washington Post 
News Service combines stories from those papers; the Knight-
Ridder/Tribune Information Service pools stories from the Tribune and the 
Knight-Ridder chain's papers. Subscribers can reprint the originating paper's 
stories (and those of other papers that contribute to the supplemental 
service) in the subscribers' home markets. Cartoons, op-ed pieces, book 
reviews, chess columns, puzzles, and other features are available from 
syndicators such as United Press Syndicate, United Features Syndicate, 
King Features Syndicate, Creators Syndicate, and Tribune Media Services. 
 
Supplemental news services and features syndicators offer exclusive 
contracts to subscribers in each metropolitan area. Because the Chicago 
Tribune subscribes to the New York Times News Service, stories from the 
Times are unavailable to the Chicago Sun-Times and smaller newspapers in 
the Chicago area; the Sun-Times subscribes to the Los Angeles 
Times/Washington Post News Service, which therefore is unavailable to the 
Tribune and smaller papers. News services and features syndicates charge 
by the circulation of the subscribing paper, and they therefore strive to sign 
up the largest paper in each market. Exclusivity is one valuable feature the 
service offers, for a paper with exclusive rights to a service or feature is 
both more attractive to readers and more distinctive from its rivals. When 
selling to smaller papers, however, the supplemental news services and 
features syndicates generally do not offer exclusivity-for they still hope to 
interest the larger, and therefore more lucrative, papers in the market (which 
can sign up later with exclusive rights against all but the original customer). 
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As a rule, the larger papers subscribe to the more popular services and 
features; or perhaps it is the very fact that a feature runs in a market's larger 
papers that makes it “more popular.” Causation need not concern us. No 
matter which way it runs, smaller papers perceive that they get the crumbs. 
This suit, by the Daily Herald, the number three general-interest paper in 
the Chicago area (with 6.7 percent of average weekly readership), contends 
that the pattern of exclusive distribution rights violates § 1 of the Sherman 
Antitrust Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1, by making it harder for small papers to grow. 
Like the district court, we assume without deciding that “general-interest-
newspaper readership in the Chicago SMSA” is a market. According to the 
complaint, the Chicago Tribune and the Chicago Sun-Times have locked up 
the “most popular” or “best” supplemental services and features, injuring 
consumers by frustrating competition. (We assume that “the best” services 
and features can constitute a market, although it sounds more like an 
aesthetic judgment; no one would say that “the best film of 1996” has a 
monopoly of any market just because there can be only one “best” film.) 
The Daily Herald views the Knight-Ridder/Tribune Information Service as 
a distant third to the supplemental news services the Tribune and Sun-Times 
use, and even it is unavailable because the Tribune will not license its 
stories to a competitor in its home market. The Herald concedes that the 
Associated Press, Reuters, and many quality comics and features are 
available to it (for example, it publishes Dilbert, one of today's most-
followed comic strips) but insists that the best ones are committed to its 
larger rivals. After assuming that all of the Herald's allegations are true, the 
district court dismissed the complaint for failure to state a claim on which 
relief may be granted. 
 
The Herald does not contend that the Tribune has conspired with the 
Sun-Times to bring about this state of affairs. Compare Associated Press v. 
United States, 326 U.S. 1 (1945) (holding that the Associated Press, a 
consortium of newspapers, must eliminate an exclusivity feature that could 
be traced to agreement among horizontal rivals). Nor does it contend that 
the supplemental news services and features syndicators (or their 
contributing papers and authors) have agreed among themselves. It 
concedes that each has adopted its method of doing business independently; 
they take the same approach to distribution because each has discovered 
that it is the most profitable way to do business. All of the contracts 
between services and newspapers are terminable at will or on short notice 
(usually 30 days, although some features require a year's notice). Instead of 
seeing whether money could persuade a supplemental news service to cut 
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off one of the larger papers-the Herald has never tried to outbid the Tribune 
or Sun-Times, either on a total compensation basis or a per-subscriber basis-
it asked the district court to declare that the antitrust laws entitle it to 
receive the leading supplemental news services and features without regard 
to the contractual exclusivity that the Tribune and Sun-Times currently 
enjoy. At times the Herald suggests that it would be happy with rights to 
articles from the New York Times, Los Angeles Times, and Washington Post 
that the Tribune and Sun-Times do not reprint; “there's plenty for all” is a 
theme of its brief. But this won't work well for news (must the Tribune give 
the Herald advance notice of its contents?) or at all for features, which are 
sold one at a time. For example, King Features Syndicate does not sell its 
entire portfolio to one paper per market; the Tribune, Sun-Times, and 
Herald each publish some of its comics and columns. So the Herald 
necessarily argues that it is entitled to run Peanuts and Dick Tracy even 
though these comic strips also appear in the Tribune. 
 
This is fundamentally an “essential facilities” claim-but without any 
essential facility. There are three supplemental news services that the 
Herald is willing to acknowledge as major competitors (and others besides, 
though the Herald denigrates them). There are hundreds, if not thousands, 
of opinion and entertainment features; a newspaper deprived of access to 
the New York Times crosswords puzzles can find others, even if the Times 
has the best known one. Unlike United States v. Terminal Railroad Ass'n, 
224 U.S. 383 (1912), the granddaddy of these cases, in which the Court held 
that a bottleneck facility that could not feasibly be duplicated must be 
shared among rivals, this case does not involve a single facility that 
monopolizes one level of production and creates a potential to extend the 
monopoly to others. We have, instead, competition at each level of 
production; no one can “take over” another level of production by 
withholding access from disfavored rivals. Flip Side Productions, Inc. v. 
Jam Productions, Ltd., 843 F.2d 1024, 1032-34 (7th Cir.1988), holds that 
the existence of three competing facilities not only means that none is an 
“essential facility” but also means that each of the three is entitled to sign an 
exclusive contract with a favored user. Other firms that want to enter the 
market can do so by competing at intervals for these contracts. 
 
Competition-for-the-contract is a form of competition that antitrust laws 
protect rather than proscribe, and it is common. Every year or two, General 
Motors, Ford, and Chrysler invite tire manufacturers to bid for exclusive 
rights to have their tires used in the manufacturers' cars. Exclusive contracts 
make the market hard to enter in mid-year but cannot stifle competition 
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over the longer run, and competition of this kind drives down the price of 
tires, to the ultimate benefit of consumers. Just so in the news business-if 
smaller newspapers are willing to bid with cash rather than legal talent. In 
the meantime, exclusive stories and features help the newspapers 
differentiate themselves, the better to compete with one another. A market 
in which every newspaper carried the same stories, columns, and cartoons 
would be a less vigorous market than the existing one. And a market in 
which the creators of intellectual property (such as the New York Times) 
could not decide how best to market it for maximum profit would be a 
market with less (or less interesting) intellectual property created in the first 
place. No one can take the supply of well researched and written news as a 
given; legal rulings that diminish the incentive to find and explicate the 
news (by reducing the return from that business) have little to commend 
them. 
 
In what way could the news services' practices harm consumers? Tacit 
collusion (economists' term for “shared monopoly”) could be a source of 
monopoly profits and injury to consumers even if none of the stages of 
production is monopolized. Some distribution arrangements might be 
objectionable because they facilitate tacit collusion. But collusion, tacit or 
express, requires some horizontal cooperation, or at least forbearance from 
vigorous competition among rivals. See Herbert Hovenkamp, Federal 
Antitrust Policy § 4.4 (1994). Compare Richard A. Posner, Antitrust Law: 
An Economic Perspective 42-77 (1976), with Donald F. Turner, The 
Definition of Agreement Under the Sherman Act: Conscious Parallelism 
and Refusals to Deal, 75 Harv.L.Rev. 655 (1962). Although the newspaper 
market is concentrated on the readers' side, the inputs to newspaper 
production are unconcentrated and therefore do not facilitate tacit collusion 
in the more concentrated market. The New York Times News Service 
competes for column inches of ink not only with other supplemental news 
services but also with the Associated Press, Reuters, and the reporters of the 
subscribing papers. Markets here are less concentrated, and use fewer of the 
devices that facilitate oligopolistic interdependence, than the markets in E.I. 
Du Pont de Nemours & Co. v. FTC, 729 F.2d 128 (2d Cir.1984), where an 
antitrust claim was nonetheless rejected. The Herald does not argue that the 
practices at hand facilitate tacit collusion. 
 
What the Herald does argue is that a mixture of fewness of firms, 
exclusive contracts, and relations between suppliers and users of news that 
endure despite short contract terms, hampers the growth of small rivals even 
though each market is competitive. Such an argument does not come within 
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any of the economic approaches to tacit collusion-but it does, the Herald 
insists, come within the holding of FTC v. Motion Picture Advertising 
Service Co., 344 U.S. 392 (1953). The Herald relies as well on Standard 
Oil Co. v. United States, 337 U.S. 293 (1949) (Standard Stations), and 
United States v. Loew's, Inc., 371 U.S. 38 (1962), but rightly treats Motion 
Picture Advertising Service as its best case. 
 
Four companies signed approximately 75 percent of the nation's motion 
picture theaters to exclusive-dealing contracts for advertisements to be 
displayed along with the films. Having signed with one supplier of ads, a 
theater could not display ads furnished by another. The Federal Trade 
Commission concluded that these arrangements, in the aggregate, stifled 
competition by firms that wanted to enter the business of furnishing 
advertising to theaters, and therefore violated § 5 of the Federal Trade 
Commission Act, 15 U.S.C. § 45: as the Supreme Court phrased the FTC's 
conclusion, “due to the exclusive contracts, respondent and the three other 
major companies have foreclosed to competitors 75 percent of all available 
outlets for this business throughout the United States.” 344 U.S. at 395. 
According to the Herald, the same kind of thing now has occurred in the 
news industry, making it equally appropriate to aggregate the market shares 
of the firms without proof of horizontal collaboration (for there was none in 
Motion Picture Advertising Service). The district court was not impressed, 
for the approach of Motion Picture Advertising Service-which depends on 
“foreclosure” of sales to competitors without proof of injury to consumers-
reflects a bygone day in antitrust analysis. But the district court properly did 
not rely entirely on a belief that the opinion is a derelict. See Khan v. State 
Oil Co., 93 F.3d 1358, 1362-64 (7th Cir.1996) (implementing another 
antique antitrust opinion that is unlikely to be reaffirmed if the Supreme 
Court revisits the subject). It held that Motion Picture Advertising Service is 
not controlling even if it remains authoritative. 
 
First, Motion Picture Advertising Service was decided under § 5 of the 
FTC Act. The Commission has the authority under that provision to forbid 
practices that pose risks to effective competition, even when they do not 
violate the Sherman Act. The Court remarked on this in Motion Picture 
Advertising Service: “The ‘unfair methods of competition,’ which are 
condemned by § 5(a) of the Act, are not confined to those that were illegal 
at common law or that were condemned by the Sherman Act.” 344 U.S. at 
394. A district court lacks the FTC's power to go beyond the limits of the 
Sherman Act. Similarly, Standard Stations was decided under § 3 of the 
Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. § 14, and does not assist the plaintiff in a Sherman 
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Act case that cannot be characterized as involving tie-in sales. Granted, the 
Court remarked in Motion Picture Advertising Service that “a device which 
has sewed up a market so tightly for the benefit of a few falls within the 
prohibitions of the Sherman Act”, 344 U.S. at 395, but this bald and 
unreasoned assertion is not conclusive. Poorly reasoned holdings bind the 
inferior courts; unreasoned dictum does not-and this statement was obiter 
dictum, for the Court had emphasized only a paragraph before that it was 
deferring to the FTC's findings as § 5 of the FTC Act requires. No 
subsequent case has read Motion Picture Advertising Service to abolish the 
requirement of concerted action under § 1 of the Sherman Act. 
 
Second, Motion Picture Advertising Service involved exclusive dealing, 
while this case involves exclusive distributorships. Despite the similarity in 
nomenclature, there is a difference-one vital to the theory of Motion Picture 
Advertising Service itself. See generally Hovenkamp, Federal Antitrust 
Policy § 10.8. An exclusive dealing contract obliges a firm to obtain its 
inputs from a single source. Each of the theaters was committed to one 
distributor for all of its ads. This was the genesis of the concern about 
foreclosure. A new advertising distributor could not find outlets. An 
exclusive distributorship, by contrast, does not restrict entry at either level. 
None of the newspapers in Chicago (or anywhere else) has promised by 
contract to obtain all of its news from a single source-and the sources have 
not locked all of their output together (unlike the “block booking” involved 
in Loew's). A new entrant to the supplemental news service business could 
sell to every newspaper in the United States, if it chose to do so. Existing 
features syndicates sell to multiple firms in the same market (although most 
features go to one paper per city; this is the exclusive distribution aspect of 
the contracts). So vendors can and do sell news and features to multiple 
customers, and customers can and do buy news and features from multiple 
vendors. “Foreclosure” of the kind about which Motion Picture Advertising 
Service was concerned does not occur under exclusive distribution 
contracts. 
 
Third, the FTC and the Supreme Court concluded that even exclusive 
dealing contracts are lawful if limited to a year's duration. 344 U.S. at 395-
96. The Commission saw that exclusivity can promote competition by 
making it feasible for firms to invest in promoting their products-for these 
costs would not be recoverable if the contracts were of very short terms, or 
if rivals could exhibit the same films and obtain the benefit of this 
promotional activity. Moreover, with year-long contracts, the entire market 
is up for grabs. A new entrant can sell to a twelfth of the theaters in the first 
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month, a sixth of all theaters by the end of the second month, and so on; 
competition for the contract makes it possible to have the benefits of 
exclusivity and rivalry simultaneously. Things work similarly in the 
newspaper business. Contract terms are short, so competition for the 
contract can flourish. Meanwhile, exclusive distribution of news or features 
through a single paper in a city helps the paper distinguish itself from, and 
compete with, its rivals. The SunTimes will not promote a readership for a 
particular columnist if the Tribune and the Herald carry the same column; 
free-riding would spoil the investment and thwart this aspect of 
competition. 
 
Contracts in the news business, unlike those in the motion picture 
advertising business, are of indefinite duration, and either side may 
terminate after giving the required advance notice. According to the Herald, 
this makes all the difference, but we don't see why. A termination clause 
works just like a stated time limit in facilitating competition for the contract. 
The FTC did not insist that dealings between a distributor and a theater 
cease after a year; the parties were free to renew their arrangement for 
successive years; it was enough that there be an option to change 
distributors or renegotiate once a year. That option exists in the newspaper 
business. Both sides to these contracts enjoy an annual (or more frequent) 
right to negotiate new terms or change partners. To this the Herald 
responds, in essence: The contracts aren't terminated in fact, so the legal 
terms do not matter; the contracts should be treated as perpetual. Yet for all 
we can tell renewal was (and remains) the norm in the motion picture 
business. As long as arrangements serve the interests of both parties, they 
will continue, whether that means signing another in a series of one-year 
contracts or declining to exercise an annual option to cancel a contract. 
Enduring exclusive distribution contracts characterize markets that are 
recognized as competitive: for example, Babylon 5 appears exclusively on 
WPWR-TV (Channel 50) in Chicago, and almost all other shows are 
exhibited exclusively on one channel per locale, sticking with that station 
for their entire original production run, even though no one thinks that 
individual stations or producers have market power. Cf. Schurz 
Communications, Inc. v. FCC, 982 F.2d 1043 (7th Cir.1992); Capital 
Cities/ABC, Inc. v. FCC, 29 F.3d 309 (7th Cir.1994). The FTC and the 
Supreme Court in Motion Picture Advertising Service wanted to ensure that 
dealings continued only while they remained in the interests of both 
distributors and theaters-which meant that someone else could come along 
with a better deal and get the business. Likewise someone with a better 
offer can get or sell news on short notice. The Herald has never tried to 
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make a better offer, and we conclude that it has come to the wrong forum. It 
should try to outbid the Tribune and Sun-Times in the marketplace, rather 
than to outmaneuver them in court. 
AFFIRMED. 
 
NOTES AND QUESTIONS 
 
1.  An “output contract,” or “exclusive dealership” is an agreement in which 
a supplier appoints a single dealer and promises not to appoint other dealers 
in that area.  They are governed by antitrust’s rule of reason, which means 
that they are unlawful only if at least one of the two parties has market 
power in the area in question and if the restriction can be shown to exclude 
rivals unreasonably. See 8 Phillip E. Areeda & Herbert Hovenkamp, 
Antitrust Law ¶¶1650-1654 (3d ed. 2010). Why would a supplier appoint a 
single distributor in a region?  Ordinarily not to create a monopoly there 
because the monopoly profits would go to the distributor, making the 
supplier worse off.  See E & L Consulting, Ltd. v. Domain Industries, Ltd., 472 
F.3d 23 (2d Cir. 2006), cert. denied, 552 U.S. 816 (2007), which held that even 
when the supplier had a high market share its appointment of a single dealer was 
lawful: 
[A]n exclusive distributorship would be counterproductive so far as any 
monopolization goal of Doman [the supplier] is concerned. A monopolist 
manufacturer of a product restricts output of the product in order to 
maximize its profits. The power to restrict output to maximize profit is 
complete in the manufacturing monopoly, and there is no additional 
monopoly profit to be made by creating a monopoly in the retail 
distribution of the product. On the contrary, a firm with a monopoly at the 
retail distribution level will further reduce output to maximize its profits, 
thereby reducing the sales and profit of the monopoly manufacturer. Like 
any seller of a product, a monopolist would prefer multiple competing 
buyers unless an exclusive distributorship arrangement provides other 
benefits in the way of, for example, product promotion or distribution. In 
fact, we have explicitly noted that “a vertically structured monopoly can 
take only one monopoly profit.” 
The only detriment to competition alleged to result from the Doman-
Sherwood agreement is that “end-users of lumber and finished wood 
products have fewer options to purchase their required supplies and are 
now required to pay artificially inflated prices.” This, by itself, is not a 
sufficient allegation of harm to competition caused by the exclusive 
distributorship, again, because the alleged single source and price increase, 
even if monopolistic, is something Doman can achieve without the aid of a 
distributor. 
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What if it is the distributor rather than the supplier who is the 
monopolist?  In that case the distributor might insist on an exclusive right at 
the supplier’s expense.   
 
2.  What if the supplier simply wants to go into business for itself in the 
affected area and thus not use any independent dealer at all?  See Spectators' 
Communication Network Inc. v. Colonial Country Club, 253 F.3d 215 (5th 
Cir. 2001). The Fifth Circuit denied summary judgment on a Sherman Act 
§1 challenge to the defendant Professional Golfers Association (PGA) for 
dropping the plaintiff's license to broadcast PGA tournaments on site. While 
the plaintiff had previously done such broadcasts, the PGA wished to enter 
the business for itself and negotiated a new contract with a large sponsor, 
the Anheuser-Busch brewery, under which the PGA provided the services 
through an agent and Spectators, the plaintiff, was excluded. The court did 
not explain how substitution of one broadcaster for another could injure 
competition. More significantly, in this case the substituted provider was 
the PGA itself, which had made the decision to integrate vertically into 
broadcasting of its own games. The court thus appeared to hold that once a 
third party is established as a dealer in a distribution chain the antitrust laws 
give it a right to stay there unmolested by the supplier's wish to engage in 
self-distribution.  Is that good antitrust policy? 
 
 THE AUTHORS GUILD V. GOOGLE, INC. 
770 F.Supp.2d 666 (S.D.N.Y. 2011) 
 
CHIN, Circuit Judge. 
 
Before the Court is plaintiffs' motion pursuant to Rule 23 of the 
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure for final approval of the proposed 
settlement of this class action on the terms set forth in the Amended 
Settlement Agreement (the “ASA”). The question presented is whether the 
ASA is fair, adequate, and reasonable. I conclude that it is not. 
 
While the digitization of books and the creation of a universal digital 
library would benefit many, the ASA would simply go too far. It would 
permit this class action—which was brought against defendant Google Inc. 
(“Google”) to challenge its scanning of books and display of “snippets” for 
on-line searching—to implement a forward-looking business arrangement 
that would grant Google significant rights to exploit entire books, without 
permission of the copyright owners. Indeed, the ASA would give Google a 
significant advantage over competitors, rewarding it for engaging in 
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wholesale copying of copyrighted works without permission, while 
releasing claims well beyond those presented in the case. 
 
…  In 2004, Google announced that it had entered into agreements 
with several major research libraries to digitally copy books and other 
writings in their collections. Since then, Google has scanned more than 12 
million books. It has delivered digital copies to the participating libraries, 
created an electronic database of books, and made text available for online 
searching….  Google users can search its “digital library” and view 
excerpts—“snippets”—from books in its digital collection. 
 
The benefits of Google's book project are many. Books will become 
more accessible. Libraries, schools, researchers, and disadvantaged 
populations will gain access to far more books. Digitization will facilitate 
the conversion of books to Braille and audio formats, increasing access for 
individuals with disabilities. Authors and publishers will benefit as well, as 
new audiences will be generated and new sources of income created. Older 
books—particularly out-of-print books, many of which are falling apart 
buried in library stacks-will be preserved and given new life.  
 
Millions of the books scanned by Google, however, were still under 
copyright, and Google did not obtain copyright permission to scan the 
books.
2
 As a consequence, in 2005, certain authors and publishers brought 
this class action and the related case, respectively, charging Google with 
copyright infringement. The authors seek both damages and injunctive 
relief, and the publishers seek injunctive relief. Google's principal defense is 
fair use under § 107 of the Copyright Act, 17 U.S.C. § 107. 
 
The parties engaged in document discovery and, in the fall of 2006, 
began settlement negotiations. On October 28, 2008, after extended 
discussions, the parties filed a proposed settlement agreement. 
 
The ASA is a complex document. It is 166 pages long, not including 
attachments. Article I sets forth 162 definitions, including the capitalized 
terms discussed below. I will not describe the ASA in detail, but will 
                                                 
2
 “Google proceeded to scan, digitize, and copy books ... without attempting to 
contract with rightsholders beforehand to obtain rights and licenses to copy in-
copyright books and display portions of them on its website. In doing so, Google 
reversed the default copyright arrangement by shifting the burden to rightsholders 
to assert their rights.” Alessandra Glorioso, Google Books: An Orphan Works 
Solution, 38 Hofstra L.Rev. 971, 992 (2010) (footnotes omitted). 
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summarize its principal provisions. 
 
The Class consists of all persons (and their heirs, successors, and 
assigns) who, as of January 5, 2009, own a U.S. copyright interest in one or 
more Books or Inserts…. 
 
Under the ASA, Google is authorized to (1) continue to digitize 
Books and Inserts, (2) sell subscriptions to an electronic Books database, (3) 
sell online access to individual Books, (4) sell advertising on pages from 
Books, and (5) make certain other prescribed uses.  The rights granted to 
Google are non-exclusive; Rightsholders retain the right to authorize others, 
including competitors of Google, to use their Books in any way.  Google 
will pay to Rightsholders 63% of all revenues received from these uses, and 
revenues will be distributed in accordance with a Plan of Allocation and 
Author–Publisher Procedures. 
 
The ASA will establish a Book Rights Registry (the “Registry”) that 
will maintain a database of Rightsholders, and the Registry will administer 
distributions of revenues. Google will fund the establishment and initial 
operations of the Registry with a payment of $34.5 million (which will also 
cover the costs of notice to the Class). The Registry will be managed by a 
Board consisting of an equal number of Author Sub–Class and Publisher 
Sub–Class representatives (at least four each). The ASA will also create an 
“independent” Unclaimed Works Fiduciary to represent interests with 
respect to, and assume responsibility for certain decisions pertaining to, 
unclaimed works, including pricing and book classification. 
 
Rights holders can exclude their Books from some or all of the uses 
listed above, and they can remove their Books altogether from the database. 
At any time Rightsholders can ask Google not to digitize any Books not yet 
digitized, and Google will use “reasonable efforts” not to digitize any such 
Books. A Rights holder may also request removal from the Registry of a 
Book already digitized…. 
 
Going forward, the ASA provides for Google to split revenues with 
Rightsholders. For works covered by the ASA, Google will pay to the 
Registry, on behalf of Rightsholders, 70% of net revenues from sales and 
advertising; net revenues reflect a 10% deduction for Google's operating 
costs…. 
 
The ASA obligates the Registry to use “commercially reasonable 
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efforts” to locate Rightsholders…. After ten years, unclaimed funds may be 
distributed to literary-based charities. 
 
The ASA distinguishes between in-print (Commercially Available) 
and out-of-print (not Commercially Available) Books. Google may not 
display in-print Books at all unless and until it receives prior express 
authorization from the Books' Rightsholders. The ASA does give Google 
the right to make Non–Display Uses of in-print Books.  Google may display 
out-of-print Books without the prior express authorization of the Books' 
Rightsholders, but its right to do so ceases when and if the Rightsholder 
directs Google to stop. 
 
Approximately 500 submissions were filed commenting on the ASA 
and the original proposed settlement. The vast majority objected to the 
ASA. 
 
Certain objectors, including two of Google's major competitors, 
Amazon.com, Inc. (“Amazon”) and Microsoft Corp. (“Microsoft”), object 
to the ASA on the grounds it would violate existing copyright law. They 
contend, for example, that judicial approval of the ASA would infringe on 
Congress's constitutional authority over copyright law. They contend further 
that the provisions of the ASA pertaining to “orphan works” would result in 
the involuntary transfer of copyrights in violation of the Copyright Act, as 
copyrighted works would be licensed without the owners' consent. See 17 
U.S.C. § 201(e). 
 
Certain objectors oppose the ASA on antitrust grounds, arguing that 
(1) certain pricing mechanisms would constitute horizontal agreements that 
would violate the Sherman Act; (2) the ASA would effectively grant 
Google a monopoly over digital books, and, in particular, orphan books; 
and (3) such a monopoly would further entrench Google's dominant 
position in the online search business. 
 
Certain objectors, including the Center for Democracy and 
Technology and the Electronic Privacy Information Center, contend that the 
ASA raises significant privacy issues, as the digitization of books would 
enable Google to amass a huge collection of information, including private 
information about identifiable users, without providing adequate protections 
regarding the use of such information…. 
 
Public policy, of course, favors settlement. Wal–Mart Stores, 396 
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F.3d at 116–17; accord Williams v. First Nat'l Bank, 216 U.S. 582, 595 
(1910) (“Compromises of disputed claims are favored by the courts.”); TBK 
Partners, Ltd. v. W. Union Corp., 675 F.2d 456, 461 (2d Cir.1982) (noting 
“the paramount policy of encouraging settlements”). Consequently, when 
evaluating a settlement agreement, the court is not to substitute its judgment 
for that of the parties, nor is it to turn consideration of the adequacy of the 
settlement “into a trial or a rehearsal of the trial.” Grinnell, 495 F.2d at 
462. “Rather, the Court's responsibility is to reach an intelligent and 
objective opinion of the probabilities of ultimate success should the claims 
be litigated and to form an educated estimate of the complexity, expense 
and likely duration of such litigation and all other factors relevant to a full 
and fair assessment of the wisdom of the proposed compromise.” …. 
 
Although I am persuaded that the parties are seeking in good faith to 
use this class action to create an effective and beneficial marketplace for 
digital books, I am troubled in several respects. 
 
A Matter for Congress 
 
First, the establishment of a mechanism for exploiting unclaimed 
books is a matter more suited for Congress than this Court. The ASA would 
create, for example, the Registry and the Fiduciary. Together, they would 
represent—purportedly on an independent basis—the interests of 
Rightsholders, including those who have not registered but are covered 
merely because they did not opt out. 
 
The questions of who should be entrusted with guardianship over 
orphan books, under what terms, and with what safeguards are matters more 
appropriately decided by Congress than through an agreement among 
private, self-interested parties. Indeed, the Supreme Court has held that “it 
is generally for Congress, not the courts, to decide how best to pursue the 
Copyright Clause's objectives.” Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186, 212 
(2003); accord Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 
417, 429 (1984) (“[I]t is Congress that has been assigned the task of 
defining the scope of the limited monopoly that should be granted to 
authors or to inventors in order to give the public appropriate access to their 
work product.”). 
 
From its beginning, the law of copyright has developed in response 
to significant changes in technology. Indeed, it was the invention of a new 
form of copying equipment—the printing press—that gave rise to the 
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original need for copyright protection. Repeatedly, as new developments 
have occurred in this country, it has been the Congress that has fashioned 
new rules that new technology made necessary. 
464 U.S. at 430–31 (footnotes omitted). 
 
In fact, Congress has made “longstanding efforts” to enact 
legislation to address the issue of orphan works. (Objections of Microsoft to 
ASA & Certification of Class 4–5 & nn. 10–11, ECF No. 874 (quoting 
Statement of Marybeth Peters)). “Orphan Books” legislation was proposed 
in Congress in 2006 and 2008, but the proposed laws were not 
enacted. See Glorioso, supra n. 3, at 980 (reviewing proposed 
legislation)…. 
 
Copyright Concerns 
 
… [T]he Copyright Clause of the Constitution grants Congress the 
power “[t]o promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts, by securing 
for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to their 
respective Writings and Discoveries.” U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, cl. 8. The 
Supreme Court has recognized that courts should encroach only reluctantly 
on Congress's legislative prerogative to address copyright issues presented 
by technological developments: “Sound policy, as well as history, supports 
our consistent deference to Congress when major technological innovations 
alter the market for copyrighted materials.” Sony, 464 U.S. at 431. 
 
The ASA raises statutory concerns as well. Certain objectors 
contend that the ASA's opt-out provisions would grant Google the ability to 
expropriate the rights of copyright owners who have not agreed to transfer 
those rights. The argument may have merit. The Copyright Act provides: 
 
When an individual author's ownership of a copyright, or any of 
the exclusive rights under a copyright, has not previously been 
transferred voluntarily by that individual author, no action by any 
governmental body or other official or organization purporting to 
seize, expropriate, transfer, or exercise rights of ownership with 
respect to the copyright, or any of the exclusive rights under the 
copyright, shall be given effect under this title, except as provided 
under title 11. 
 
17 U.S.C. § 201(e). Yet, the ASA proposes to expropriate rights of 
individuals involuntarily. 
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A copyright owner's right to exclude others from using his property 
is fundamental and beyond dispute.   As counsel for Amazon argued: “[T]he 
law of the United States is a copyright owner may sit back, do nothing and 
enjoy his property rights untrammeled by others exploiting his works 
without permission.” Under the ASA, however, if copyright owners sit back 
and do nothing, they lose their rights.  Absent class members who fail to opt 
out will be deemed to have released their rights even as to future infringing 
conduct. “Copyright owners who are not aware that the [ASA] affects their 
interest unknowingly leave Google to decide how their books are used.” 
 
Many objectors highlighted this concern in their submissions to the 
Court. An author from the United Kingdom states, very simply: “I do not 
want my books to be digitized.”  A 79–year old nature writer and author of 
23 books illustrated with photographs of animals in the wild worries that the 
loss of control over her works could result in their being used to “vilif[y] 
the wildlife I spent my life trying to help the public come to understand and 
protect.”…  Finally, an author from Texas gives the example of her 
grandfather. He self-published a memoir, Dust and Snow, in 1988. He 
passed away in the 1990s, and the copyright to the book passed to his three 
daughters. The author observes: 
 
From Google's point of view, Dust and Snow is an 
“orphaned” book. If and when Google scans it, the company is 
likely to be unsuccessful in trying to locate the publisher, since the 
book was self-published and my grandfather is now deceased. In 
essence, the way the settlement is written, such “orphaned” titles are 
automatically handed to Google free of charge to do with as it will. 
 
From my family's point of view, Dust and Snow is not 
orphaned at all. It is very clear who owns the copyright. So why is 
Google being granted the automatic right to take over the copyright 
of books like my grandfather's? 
 
While the named plaintiffs and Google would argue that these 
authors can simply opt out, the comments underscore certain points. First, 
many authors of unclaimed works undoubtedly share similar concerns. 
Second, it is incongruous with the purpose of the copyright laws to place 
the onus on copyright owners to come forward to protect their rights when 
Google copied their works without first seeking their permission. 
FN18
 Third, 
there are likely to be many authors—including those whose works will not 
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be scanned by Google until some years in the future—who will simply not 
know to come forward. 
 
Antitrust Concerns 
 
The United States, Amazon, and Microsoft, among others, raise a 
number of antitrust concerns presented by the ASA. 
 
The ASA would give Google a de facto monopoly over unclaimed 
works. Only Google has engaged in the copying of books en masse without 
copyright permission.  As the United States observed in its original 
statement of interest: 
 
This de facto exclusivity (at least as to orphan works) appears to 
create a dangerous probability that only Google would have the 
ability to market to libraries and other institutions a comprehensive 
digital-book subscription. The seller of an incomplete database—
 i.e., one that does not include the millions of orphan works—cannot 
compete effectively with the seller of a comprehensive product. 
 
And as counsel for the Internet Archive noted, the ASA would give Google 
“a right, which no one else in the world would have, ... to digitize works 
with impunity, without any risk of statutory liability, for something like 150 
years.” 
 
The ASA would arguably give Google control over the search 
market  The ASA would permit third parties to display snippets from books 
scanned by Google, but only if they “have entered into agreements with 
Google.”  Likewise, the ASA would permit third parties to “index and 
search” scanned books only if they are non-commercial entities or they 
otherwise have Google's prior written consent.  The ASA would broadly bar 
“direct, for profit, commercial use of information extracted from Books in 
the Research Corpus” except with the express permission of the 
Registry and Google.  Google's ability to deny competitors the ability to 
search orphan books would further entrench Google's market power in the 
online search market. 
 
International Law Concerns 
 
The original settlement included any book subject to a U.S. 
copyright interest as of the Notice Commencement Date. That definition 
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would have included all books published after 1989 in any country that is a 
signatory to the Berne Convention because the Berne Convention 
guarantees that foreign authors be given the same rights and privileges for 
their works as domestic authors. As the United States signed onto the Berne 
Convention in 1988, and it became effective in 1989, foreign books are 
covered by U.S. copyright protection (regardless of formal registration) 
after the effective date. 
 
The ASA narrowed the definition so that any non-“United States 
work,” see 17 U.S.C. § 101, is covered only if the copyright was 
affirmatively registered in Washington, D.C. or if the Book was published 
in Canada, the United Kingdom, or Australia, on or before January 5, 2009. 
… 
 
,,, [C]ertain foreign objectors emphasize that the problem of orphan 
books is a global one. As Germany notes: “Courts and class action 
settlements are not the proper province for creating a cutting edge copyright 
... framework to bind future generations and impact global competition for 
the future of digital libraries.”  Likewise, France argues: 
 
Concerning Unclaimed books, national laws on “orphan” or 
“unclaimed” books in the digital age are now being elaborated in 
many countries. Each nation, pursuant to its own governing laws 
and structure, is the only actor with sufficient legitimacy to make 
decisions that affect Copyright. France considers that, in the 
meantime, any digital exploitation of books must abide by the 
international principles of copyright and, in particular, the prior 
consent of the rights holders. 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
In the end, I conclude that the ASA is not fair, adequate, and 
reasonable. As the United States and other objectors have noted, many of 
the concerns raised in the objections would be ameliorated if the ASA were 
converted from an “opt-out” settlement to an “opt-in” settlement.   I urge 
the parties to consider revising the ASA accordingly. 
 
The motion for final approval of the ASA is denied, without 
prejudice to renewal in the event the parties negotiate a revised settlement 
agreement. The motion for an award of attorneys' fees and costs is denied, 
without prejudice. 
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NOTES AND QUESTIONS 
 
1.   The opinion notes that Google’s rights to the original books (not to 
Google’s own scans) are non-exclusive.  That is, anyone else can duplicate 
all or any part of Google’s library, or individual authors can agree to permit 
others scan their works.  Since scanning technology is readily available 
should this serve to satisfy all antitrust concerns?  Or is Google’s headstart 
alone decisive? 
 
2.  Many of the books subject to the settlement agreement are in the public 
domain, either because their maximum copyright term had expired or else 
because they had not been renewed under terms of the pre-1976 Copyright 
Act.  Others were still under copyright but out of print, meaning that they 
could perhaps be found in some libraries or used book stores, but were not 
available for purchase from the publisher.  Still others were so-called 
“orphan” works, or works whose copyright owners could not readily be 
located at all.  The Settlement agreement provided for the creation of a 
Registry to facilitate the recordation of ownership interests as they would 
appear over time, as well as escrowing of royalties for future payment and 
licensing of works for distribution by others. 
The court found that most of the factors stated in the Second 
Circuit’s decision in City of Detroit v. Grinnell Corp., 495 F.2d 448 (2d Cir. 
1974) regarding antitrust class action settlements favored the settlement in 
this case.  The factors are (1) the complexity, expense, and likely duration 
of the litigation; (2) the reaction of the class to the settlement; (3) the stage 
of the proceedings and the amount of discovery completed; (4) the risks of 
establishing liability; (5) the risks of establishing damages; (6) the risks of 
maintaining a class action through trial; (7) the ability of defendants to 
withstand greater judgment; (8) the range of reasonableness of the 
settlement fund in light of the best possible recovery; and (9) the range of  
Nreasonableness of the settlement fund in light of the attendant risks of 
litigation. 
 
Nevertheless, the court was concerned that the terms of the settlement 
amounted to a change in basic copyright protection that only Congress 
could effect.  In particular, the problem of locating the authors of orphan 
works was long standing.  On at least two occasions Congress had 
considered but declined to pass legislation on the issue.  The court’s 
principal concern was that the owners of orphan works had not been located 
and notified of the settlement and as a result had not been given an 
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opportunity to object to the terms or to decline participation. 
 
3. For its concerns about excessive exclusion the court relied on the 
Supreme Court’s holding in United States v. Griffith, 334 U.S. 100 (1948), 
that exclusive first run movie contracts were exclusionary when the licensee 
had monopoly power in the town in question.  But aren’t the issues quite 
different?  The exclusive first run agreements in Griffith prevented 
competing theaters from licensing the movies from any source during the 
period covered by the exclusive first run arrangement.  By contrast, the 
Google arrangement limited the rights of others to make use of Google’s 
own scans except subject to the settlement terms, but it did not limit the 
power of competitors to make their own scans independently. Given the 
extreme reluctance of United States antitrust law to force a firm to deal with 
its rivals,
3
 this antitrust objection seems unwarranted.  Clearly, the books 
settlement is output increasing when one compares the situation under the 
settlement with the status quo, in which many of these books are effectively 
unavailable at all.  An increase in output is a strong indicator that a practice 
benefits rather than harms competition.  Further, under the terms of the 
revised settlement agreement the Registry, which is independently 
controlled, may syndicate any work or collection of works in its database 
for online sale by any third party. 
 
4.  The courts, including the Second Circuit, have approved settlement 
agreements that seem far more exclusionary than the Google settlement.  
First, the Google settlement did not involve an action that would otherwise 
be per se unlawful under the antitrust laws, as many approved settlements 
have.  Indeed, it is doubtful that the settlement would violate the antitrust 
laws under the rule of reason, given its nonexclusive nature with respect to 
the original works and the wide availability of licensing of the scanned 
copies to third parties.  See the Second Circuit’s decision in Arkansas 
Carpenters Health and Welfare Fund v. Bayer AG, 604 F.3d 98, (2d Cir. 
2010), which is  reprinted in Chapter Four.  Did the Google decision follow 
the Second Circuit correctly? 
 
5.  In Authors Guild v. Google, Inc., 282 F.R.D. 384 (S.D.N.Y. 2012), the 
court approved and certified a class action alleging that Google's book 
digitization program amounted to massive copyright infringement. 
 
                                                 
3
 See Verizon Communic., Inc. v. Law Offices of Curtis V. Trinko, 540 U.S. 
398 (2004). 
